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INTRODUCTION

"[A]s regards public policy, . . . the law protects not the litigating
parties but the public; or in this case, the mass of tax-payers and other
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on these ideas at the American Society of International Law's International Economic
Law Interest Group Annual Meeting, and the Duke Corruption Roundtable. I would
also like to thank my colleagues at the University of Richmond School of Law, and my
very able research assistants, Dust Knight, Noelle Sanders, and Kate Frisch.

443

444

University of California, Davis

citizens making up . .

[Vol. 49:443

the poorest countries in the world."' So states

the arbitration award in World Duty Free v. Kenya, in which the panel
dismissed an investor's claim against the Republic of Kenya for
expropriating its investment. The panel did so because the investor
admittedly procured a government contract by bribing then-President
Daniel Arap-Moi. That President Moi had solicited and accepted the
bribe proved of little consequence.
Despite its proffered intent to help the poor and advance global anticorruption policy, the award does neither. Indeed, in practice it will
tend to do the opposite. In creating an absolute defense for state
officials who solicit and accept bribes, Duty Free exacerbates existing
imbalances and distortions in anti-bribery enforcement and ultimately
undermines global anti-corruption policy.
Though Duty Free has become part of the anti-bribery enforcement
problem, investor-state arbitration could actually be part of the
solution. As this article will show, the problems in global anti-bribery
enforcement can be explained in part by the nearly exclusive reliance
on public enforcement. Almost all we do to hold companies
accountable for overseas bribery is done by those companies' homecountry governments. As Professor Paul Carrington has previously
observed, 2 investor-state arbitration could supply a partial remedy to
this problem: it could become a venue for the private enforcement of
anti-bribery norms. Among the principal impediments to realizing
arbitration's potential as a mode of private anti-bribery enforcement is
the Duty Free holding.
But all is not lost. Duty Free rests upon a kind of three-legged stool
of legal argumentation. Those legs are: 1) the common law of contract;
2) principles of state liability for official misconduct; and 3) global
anti-corruption policy. As this article will show, each leg of that stool
is fundamentally flawed; the legal arguments are unpersuasive and
occasionally incorrect. This article seeks to deconstruct that stool,
exposing the fatal structural flaws in each leg. It thus clears the way
for building an arbitral jurisprudence of corruption that actually does
what Duty Free attempted: advance global anti-corruption policy in a
way that will inure to the true victims of corruption, who are the
citizens of the world's developing countries.
Accordingly, Part I describes global anti-corruption policy and the
problems that inhere in this, a nascent stage of worldwide
I World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 9 181
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
2 Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 129, 160-64 (2010).
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enforcement. Part 11 makes the case for private anti-bribery
enforcement. It locates the original international anti-bribery law, the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"),3 in the broader context
of U.S. white-collar enforcement, and shows how the use of
concurrent public and private enforcement in white-collar law
generally has produced benefits that could partially mitigate the
problems of anti-bribery enforcement. It further shows how
companies have thus far searched in vain for an effective venue for
private anti-bribery enforcement, and how investor-state arbitration
could become that venue. In Part III, I first describe the Duty Free
holding and its dangers. I then pick apart each of the three legs on
which it rests, one at a time. In conclusion, I allude to some of the
issues that must be resolved if investor-state arbitration is to become a
venue for the private enforcement of anti-bribery norms, and show
how permitting foreign companies to pursue corruption claims would
actually serve to defend investor-state arbitration from some of its
fiercest critics.
1.

ANTI-BRIBERY POLICY AND ITS PROBLEMS

The statute that heralded the beginning of the modern anticorruption movement - the FCPA - was very much a creature of the
geo-political climate in which it arose. That climate was the Cold War,
and the FCPA was thought to be an instrument of foreign policy. But
although the Cold War's rhetoric and worldview now seem
antiquated, the underlying policies of the FCPA are not. This section
will show how those who testified before Congress on the need for a
foreign bribery prohibition consistently argued, irrespective of
partisan affiliation, that the FCPA's purpose was to promote economic
and legal development abroad. That is, the prohibition on the
business-related bribery of foreign officials would promote the kind of
transnational investment that strengthened, rather than weakened,
host-country economic and legal institutions. The FCPA, in turn gave
rise to a global movement to prohibit such bribes. After briefly
summarizing this historical arc in Section A, Section B will show how
the current moment in the historical evolution of anti-bribery
3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. HE 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd(1)-(3),
78ff (2012)), amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. H§ 78dd(1)(3), 78ff); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. H§ 78dd(1)-(3),
78ff); see also infra Part L.A.
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enforcement is, perhaps not surprisingly, fraught with problems. But
these problems must be acknowledged if we are to fashion an
arbitration jurisprudence that advances, rather than retards, global
anti-bribery policy.
A.

The Policy

Prior to the mid-1970s, foreign bribery was a foreign law issue.
Capital exporting nations generally assumed that it was the province
of the foreign jurisdiction, the host country, to address bribery
occurring within its jurisdiction. On its face, this was not an entirely
indefensible position; virtually every government in the world has on
its books a prohibition on the bribing of domestic officials.
Accordingly, none of the major capital exporting nations had yet to
adopt a prohibition on the bribery of foreign officials. Indeed, with
one curious but obscure exception,4 such laws were completely
unknown. Considerations of comity counseled deference to domestic
laws and, just as importantly, to those jurisdictions' judgment as to
how to enforce, or whether to enforce, the prohibition. It was simply
assumed among capital-exporting nations that the host countries
would decide how, or whether, to prosecute bribery, even if that
bribery was committed by foreign corporations.
Events of the mid-1970s would expose the shortcomings of this
approach. Two concurrent historical events combined to precipitate
enactment of the FCPA. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") conducted an
investigation into the use of corporate slush funds for campaign
contributions. The investigation revealed that in addition to using
these funds to contribute to U.S. campaigns, hundreds of U.S.
corporations were similarly using these funds to bribe overseas
government officials.5
The second event 6 was the discovery that the Lockheed
Corporation, the flagship U.S. defense contractor, had paid bribes to
4 Sweden had actually enacted a prohibition on the bribery of foreign public
officials, a fact little-appreciated by the capital exporting nations at that time or by
more contemporary commentators. See Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery
Laws as TransnationalIntrusion, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 627, 638 n.60 (2000), available
at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= 1477&context=cilj.
5 U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 2-3

(1976).
6 This discussion of the Lockheed revelations and subsequent congressional
testimony originally appeared in Andrew Brady Spalding, Corruption, Corporations,
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government officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy to win bids.
Each of these countries was thought critical to the growth of liberaldemocratic institutions, and revelations of corporate bribery
undermined liberalism's credibility. A sample of congressional
testimony in support of what would become the FCPA proves
illustrative. Congressman Stephen Solarz, a Democrat from New York,
testified in 1976: "It is important to look at the problem of overseas
payments in broader terms than simply a matter of economics or even
morality."7 Solarz explained that Lockheed's payments to Japanese
officials put "'[tihe democratic system in Japan ... in grave danger." 8
Solarz thought the "most serious" and "delicate" situation was Italy,
whose government was equally split between a liberal party and the
Communist Party. 9 He noted that "[a]llegations of payments by
Lockheed served to advance the Communist cause in Italy where the
Communist bloc was strengthened by the sight of corrupt
capitalism."10

Members of Congress feared that the Communist Party could gain a
majority in the Italian parliament and the prospects for building
democratic institutions would be lost." The implications of corporate
bribery for the U.S. effort to promote the growth of democratic
institutions were thus "staggering and in some cases, perhaps

and the New Human Right, 91 WASH U. L. REV. 1365, 1371-75 (2014) [hereinafter
Corruption]. For a discussion of these foreign policy events, and their significance in
understanding the purposes of the FCPA, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

3 (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraudl/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf.
7 Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.
140 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz).
8 Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 172 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Protection Hearings] (statement of Rep. Stephen S.
Solarz) (quoting "a very senior politician close to former [Japanese] Prime Minister
Takeo Mike"). Solarz further testified that Japanese opponents to the U.S.-Japan alliance
were "handed a terribly effective weapon to drive a wedge between two close allies. At a
time of uncertainty due to the shifting balances of power in Asia, our strongest and most
stable ally in the region [was] undergoing unnecessary turbulence, and [a] relationship
which is at the very heart of our foreign policy [was] potentially jeopardized." 1976
House Consumer ProtectionSubcommittee Hearing,supra note 7, at 141.
9 See 1976 House Consumer ProtectionSubcommittee Hearing, supra note 7, at 141.
10 1977 Protection Hearings,supra note 8, at 173.
11 See 1976 House Consumer ProtectionSubcommittee Hearing, supra note 7, at 141.
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irreversible."1 2 The example of Italy demonstrated that "Communist
and other anti-U.S. forces are quick to take advantage of any evidence
with pro-Western
of immorality or corruption associated
governments. Both fear and resentment are generated among foreign
officials who become increasingly hostile as the United States
continues to expose traditional corrupt practices abroad." 13 This view
would actually prove non-partisan. It was articulated with equal force
by members of both the Ford and Carter administrations, 4 and
expressed most forcefully by Democrat George Ball, who had become
famous as a member of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations for
his opposition to the Vietnam War. Ball explained:
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising copy
and propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free enterprise
are cancelled every night when managements demonstrate by
their conduct that a sector of multinational business activity is
not free; it is bought and paid for. This is a problem that, like
so many others, has relevance in the struggle of antagonistic
12

Id. at 2.

1977 ProtectionHearings, supra note 8, at 173.
Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser in the Department of State under
President Ford, testified that corruption "jeopardizes the important interests we share
with our friends abroad" because it undermines a form of government "upon which
social progress, economic justice, and perhaps, ultimately, world peace depends . . . ."
The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the H. Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong. 23 (1975) (statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State). Treasury Secretary William E. Simon further stated that it
"adversely affect[s] our relations with foreign governments and can contribute to a
general deterioration in the climate for fair and open international trade and
investment." Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 85 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking
Hearings] (statement of William E. Simon, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury). Ford's Commerce Secretary, Elliot L. Richardson, further articulated:
"Bribery ... threatens to poison relationships between the United States and nations
with which we have long had mutually beneficial political and commercial ties." Id. at
76. Ultimately, President Ford would formally state that reports of bribery "tend to
destroy confidence" in liberal-democratic institutions. Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, Gerald R. Ford "Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed
Foreign Payments Disclosure Legislation," August 3, 1976, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
Carter
When
the
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6254.
PROJECT,
Administration moved in, his Treasury Secretary stated, "The Carter Administration
believes that it is damaging both to our country and to a healthy world economic
system for American corporations to bribe foreign officials." ForeignCorrupt Practices
and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 67 (1977) (statement of W. Michael
Blumenthal, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury).
13

14
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ideologies; for, when our enterprises stoop to bribery and
kickbacks, they give substance to the communist myth
already widely believed in Third World countries - that
capitalism is fundamentally corrupt.15
Thus, even the most liberal, reform-minded advocates recognized the
implications of international corporate bribery for the countries in
which the bribes occurred. With the integration of these themes into
both the Senate' 6 and House1 7 Reports, a notably bipartisan vision of
the FCPA's overseas role emerges. This new anti-bribery statute was
designed not merely to improve U.S. corporate governance, but to
build liberal-democratic institutions abroad. The United States
adopted this law not to wash its hands of foreign corruption, but to
create institutions that protect fundamental rights and promote
economic prosperity.
The resulting legal regime criminalized the paymenti 8 of bribes1 9 to
foreign officials. 20 Among the major capital exporting nations, the
15

1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 14, at 41-42.

See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977).
17 See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).
16

18 The FCPA forbids any act "in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay

or authorization of the payment. . . ." The DOJ has indicated that this prohibition
only applies to corrupt payments that are made with the intent to induce or influence
action from the foreign official recipient. Since this section focuses on the corrupt
intent, the FCPA does not require that the payment or action be completed or that the
recipient of the bribe be known. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supranote 6, at 14, 92.
19 The phrase "anything of value" is not defined through the statutory language or
legislative history. Yet, since foreign officials can be persuaded in more ways than just
through monetary payments, the FCPA has been enforced if "anything of value" was
given, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official. This term can include cash, jewelry,
gift certificates, travel, electronics, donations, or cars. BuSINESS CRIME 9 18.04(3)(c)
(MB 2015).
20 The FCPA defines "foreign official" as "any officer or employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof. . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2012). Until recently, the notion of an "instrumentality" was
ambiguous and remained undefined by the courts. Due to the lack of clarification, the
idea that state-owned entities or enterprises qualified as an "instrumentality" had been
challenged in recent cases. In United States v. Esquenazi, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that state-owned enterprises do qualify as an
"instrumentality," as it was defined "an entity controlled by the government of a
foreign country that performs a function the controlling government treats as its
own." See Christopher Hoffmann, Note, The Dark World of Interpreting the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct: Arguments, Cases and Critiques Illuminating Whether Employees of
State Owned EnterprisesAre "Foreign Officials," 12 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 115, 116 (2013);
Richard L. Cassin, Supremes Won't Review Esquenazi "Foreign Official" Challenge,
FCPA BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/10/6/supremes-wontreview-esquenazi-foreign-official-challenge.html.
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FCPA was the first and only such statute in the world. Postenactment, sentiment arose among the U.S. business community and
then in Congress that unilateral enactment of this prohibition put U.S.
companies at a competitive disadvantage. Perhaps for this reason, and
content to have made a symbolic gesture, the U.S. Government hardly
enforced the statute at all. Then, in 1988, Congress formally requested
that the President negotiate an international instrument with the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
to require member nations to enact FCPA-type prohibitions on the
business-related bribing of foreign officials.21 After ten years of U.S.
lobbying, the OECD enacted the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.2 2
This same period of time saw an explosion of international
instruments that collectively went beyond the FCPA's and OECD's
prohibition on the supply of bribes and prohibited the demand of
bribes as well. The year 1996 saw the enactment of the Inter-American
Convention against Corruption ("IACAC") by the Organization of
American States. 23 A year later, the European Union ("EU") enacted
24
the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials.
21 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 5003, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). The amended statute included the following directive:
"It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation of an
international agreement, among the members of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning
acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments
made by this section. Such international agreement should include a process by which
problems and conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved." Id.; see also S.
REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998) (describing efforts by Executive Branch to encourage
U.S trading partners to enact legislation to FCPA).
22 See Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
23 Organization
of American States: Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 1.L.M. 724, O.A.S.T.S. No. B 58. This Convention
directs the participating governments to create criminal sanctions for corrupt acts
involving public officials and/or those acting on their behalf. (Neither civil remedies
nor corrupt acts involving only private entities/individuals are included in the
directives of the Convention.) The prohibited acts include "the solicitation or
acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a government official or a person who performs
public functions...." and/or "[t] he offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a
government official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for
himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of his public functions." Id. art. VI (1)(a)-(b).
24 Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, May 26,
1997, Oj. (C 195) 40. The governments of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
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Then in 1999, the Group of States Against Corruption, whose fortynine members include the United States, EU member nations, and
others, adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 25 and
the Civil Law Convention on Corruption. 26 The year 2003 saw another
regional convention, the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption,27 and then ultimately a truly global agreement,
Spain, France, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria,
Portugal, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland on May 26, 1997 entered into this Convention. The Convention
prohibits both the active (supply) and passive (demand) participation in corrupt
activities. The Convention states that the request or receipt of "advantages of any kind
whatsoever" by a government official "directly or through an intermediary" for himself
or a third party (passive corruption) is a criminal act and punishable as such.
Additionally, any person who "promises or gives, directly or through an intermediary,
an advantage of any kind whatsoever to an official for himself or for a third party"
(active corruption) is also a criminal act, punishable by the applicable laws of the
country in which the offense took place. Id. (emphasis added).
25 See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S No. 173. On
January 27, 1999, forty-nine governments including the members of the European
Community as well as other nonmember states, such as the United States, entered into
this Convention. See id.; Group of States Against Corruption, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/3.%20What%20is%20GRECOen.
asp. This group of nations is known as GRECO ("Group of States Against
Corruption"). The Convention directs the participating states to create criminal
liabilities for acts of corruption involving public officials, as well as similar corrupt
acts between private entities, but does not call for the creation of civil remedies. Both
active and passive corruption (bribery) is included in the prohibited acts and the
bribery can involve any "undue advantage" given, received, promised, or requested,
either directly or through a third party. The Convention also calls for criminal
liabilities for those who 1) aid and abet bribery, 2) trade in influence, 3) launder
money from the proceeds of bribes, and/or 4) alter or create accounting records in an
attempt to conceal corrupt activity. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra.
26 See Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, E.T.S. No. 174. The
Civil Law Convention on Corruption was entered into on November 4, 1999, by the
same forty-nine governments that constitute GRECO. The Convention expands the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption by directing the participating nations to
create legislation that would provide civil (private) remedies for those who have
"suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their
rights and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage."
The acts of corruption referred to in this Convention relate directly to the prohibited
acts in the Criminal Law Convention and include corrupt acts involving public
officials and between private entities. See id.
27 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, Jul. 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/african-union-conventionpreventing-and-combating-corruption. The Member States of the African Union
entered into the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
on July 11, 2003. This Convention deals with acts of corruption involving public
officials and between private entities. The Convention speaks to both the "supply" and
the "demand" sides of corrupt activities, and provides for criminal penalties for any
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the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 28 Truly, a global
public policy against transnational bribery, on both the supply and
demand sides, had emerged.
These international instruments remain important statements of
policy, and harbingers of future enforcement commitments. Such
policies, and aspirations, were captured quite well in the Duty Free
award. But as the next section shows, the Duty Free panel seemed not
to recognize how far removed these ideals are from current
enforcement, the problems that this intermediate state of enforcement
creates, and how the Duty Free logic will compound them.
B.

Its Problems

In principle, international anti-bribery law could achieve a nearperfect degree of success in either of two ways. If all capital importing
countries enforced their domestic bribery prohibitions, the problem
would be solved: any company that did business in Nigeria or
Venezuela or Bangladesh would know that it could not pay bribes
there and would suffer the consequences for doing so. Alternatively,
we could achieve the same measure of success by implementing
effective enforcement across all capital-exporting countries: no matter
where they did business, companies subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, U.K., Germany, China, and Turkey would all play by
the same rules, subject as they were to the effective enforcement of
their home country's foreign bribery prohibition. But neither is true
today; anti-bribery enforcement remains highly nascent and, as such,
suffers from a number of deep structural imperfections.
and all participants, whether directly or indirectly involved. The prohibited acts
include solicitation or acceptance and offer or grant of any 1) "undue advantage;" 2)
goods of monetary value; 3) other benefits, including gifts, favors, promises, or
advantages; and/or 4) illicit enrichment (any significant increase in assets that the
public official or private entity "cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her
income"). The Convention does not state that any civil remedies are to be provided by
the participating countries. See id.
28 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 14, 2005, 2349 U.N.T.S.
41. Nearly every member of the United Nations has entered into the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, dated December 14, 2005. This Convention states
that participating nations must provide civil remedies and criminal liabilities for the
corrupt acts of public officials as well as private entities. Additionally, the nations are
instructed to implement measures to aid in the prevention of private and public
corrupt actions. The prohibited acts include offering or providing and requesting or
accepting an "undue advantage," either directly or indirectly. Undue advantage is not
defined; however, the Convention specifically notes bribery, laundering of proceeds of
corrupt act, embezzlement, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, concealment, and
obstruction of justice as prohibited acts. Id.
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Until these imperfections are overcome, new players in the anticorruption arena, such as International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), should not aggravate them. More to
the point, ICSID should not do so in the name of fighting corruption
or, worse yet, helping the poor. As this section will show, modern
anti-bribery enforcement suffers from at least three distinct problems:
first, it disproportionately focuses on the supply of bribes (as opposed
to the demand); second, supply-side enforcement is disproportionately
concentrated in a small fraction of the world's capital exporters; and
third, this state of enforcement now produces uncertain results in
reducing overseas bribery, and may in some instances even exacerbate
bribery. The Duty Freejurisprudence compounds each problem.
Anti-bribery enforcement began in earnest only after the
international conventions were ratified. With the so-called playing
field of international business now supposedly leveled,29 and given a
number of other changes both domestic and international, 30 the oncedormant FCPA grew teeth. Though the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ") and SEC had brought only a negligible number of
enforcement actions since 1977,31 beginning around 2004
enforcement became quite aggressive.3 2 But the enforcement stage
mirrored the enactment stage: having previously enacted unilaterally a
foreign bribery prohibition, the United States was now unilaterally
enforcing one.

29 The metaphor of the FCPA "leveling the playing field" is imbedded
in the
statute's legislative history. For a critique of this metaphor, see, for example, Spalding,
Corruption, supra note 6, at 1370, noting: "If business is a game and multinational
companies are the players, what then are the developing countries in which they do
business? The spectators? Or the turf?"
30 See Laura E. Kress, How The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Has Knocked the "SOX" off the
DOJ and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 2009 Pirr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 1
(arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act invigorated enforcement of the FCPA).
31 In the first two decades after the FCPA was passed, the DOJ and SEC
only
prosecuted seventeen companies and thirty-three individuals, in total. This equates to
only about two prosecutions per year. See Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, andJustified, 29
REV. LITIG. 439, 439-49 (2010).
32 See id. The last decade has seen a drastic increase in the number of FCPArelated cases prosecuted. In 2002, only three cases were being investigated. The
number of FCPA prosecutions then doubled between 2006 and 2007, and in contrast,
there was a total eighty-four open investigations by the end of 2007. Id. Further, the
DOJ and SEC pursued eighty-five enforcement actions between 2007 and 2012, which
yielded almost four billion dollars in settlement amounts. Mike Koehler, Keeping
FCPA Enforcement Statistics in Perspective, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/keeping-fcpa-enforcement-statistics-in-perspective.
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While some capital-exporters within the OECD have begun to
follow the United States' example, the data shows a playing field that is
far from level. The OECD has compiled enforcement data for the years
1999 to 2013, the life of the OECD Convention. Of the 41 parties to
the OECD Convention, the United States and Germany each stand out
as substantial enforcers. Total criminal and civil/administrative
sanctions (against persons both legal and natural) for the United States
is approximately 250, and for Germany, approximately 190.33 From
there, the drop off is precipitous: the unlikely candidates of Korea and
Hungary have roughly 20 actions each; France, Italy, the UK and
Japan have about 10 each; and all other members are at or near zero.34
These numbers do not include the major capital exporting nations that
have not joined the OECD Convention. Though Brazil and Russia
have each joined the Convention while not (yet) being full members
of the OECD, 35 conspicuous nonparties to the Convention include
India and, much more significantly, China. 36
33 See Working Group on Bribery: 2013 Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery
Convention, ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Sept. 2014), http://www.oecd.org/

daf/anti-bribery/Working-Group-on-Bribery-Enforcement-Data-2013.pdf.
34 Id. Transparency International uses a point system to analyze the enforcement
level of OECD countries. Points are allotted based on the level of action that the country
takes, such as initiating an investigation or commencing a case. Further, more points
will be allotted if the case involves a major company bribing senior officials, or if it ends
in sanctions. The sum of these points is then multiplied by the country's share of world
exports over a four-year period. Following the calculations, the country will be
designated into one of the following categories of enforcers: Active Enforcement (U.S.,
U.K., Germany, and Switzerland); Moderate Enforcement (Italy, Canada, Australia,
Austria, Finland); and then the remainder OECD nations falling under Limited
Enforcement or Little to No Enforcement. In contrast, the report from the Working
Group on Bribery only considers foreign bribery convictions that have been reported by
government representatives. Transparency International instead examines cases of
money laundering, tax evasion, accounting fraud or violations of the requisite disclosure
standards, and the data is collected through the organization's selected experts. See Fritz
Heimann et al., Exporting Corruption: Progress Report 2014: Assessing Enforcement of the
OECD

Convention on Combating Foreign Bribery, TRANSPARENCY

INT'L

(2014),

httpi/www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting-corruption-progressrep
ort_2014 assessing-enforcement of theoecd (discussing the status of enforcement in
all of the parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, with the exception of Latvia).
35 See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption, 23 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 11 (2013) (describing

the globalization of anti-bribery laws since the implementation of the FCPA).
36 See Jeffery R. Boles, The Two Faces of Bribery: InternationalCorruption Pathways
Meet Conflicting Legislative Regimes, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673, 684-85 (2014) (analyzing
the dynamics of bribery through public and private sectors and the different legislative
approaches to criminalizing bribery). China has adopted a foreign bribery prohibition
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Because this enforcement is uneven, the enforcing states
principally but not exclusively the United States - are actively
pressuring other countries to follow suit and ramp up enforcement.
This pressure is exerted primarily through the peer review mechanism
of the OECD Convention, whereby member states are periodically
reviewed for their enforcement efforts. 3 ' While this naming and

shaming of peer review has produced incremental increases in
enforcement, the increments are modest by any account, as the above
data show.
Non-enforcement among OECD member states is due to a host of
reasons. Some countries may lack political will, having not yet decided
that foreign bribery is a high-priority item. Or, where the political will
exists, the funding might not; states have not yet allocated the needed
resources to enforcement agencies.38 Similarly, enforcement theories
and practices that have made FCPA enforcement possible in this
country particularly the independent investigation, voluntary
disclosure, and cooperation credit - do not exist in many countries. 39
Finally, the structure or culture of enforcement agencies may not

very recently, ostensibly to honor its obligations under the United Nations
Convention against Corruption ("UNCAC"). The UNCAC requires states create and
enforce anti-corruption and anti-bribery measures, and for the member states to
exhibit cooperation between the other ratifying states to promote the implementation
of the Convention. China, unlike its western counterparts, originally opposed any
mechanism other than self-review, including the peer review system. Without a
method for rigorous enforcement, China gradually has begun to implement the
conditions of the UNCAC despite the fact that China ratified the Convention in 2006.
India has not even gone that far, and presently has no foreign bribery prohibition on
its books. Samuel R. Gintel, Fighting TransnationalBribery: China's GradualApproach,
31 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 26-27 (2013) (explaining the weak framework of China's adopted
legislation that criminalizes bribery of foreign public officials).
37 The peer review mechanism is used by OECD member states on other OECD
member states to review the policies implemented and practices used in a wide range
of areas concerning economic and social development, including but not limited to
bribery. The review creates a way for states to learn from each other and to insure
compliance with OECD principles and standards by facilitating discussions regarding
best practices and policymaking in a less formal manner. The review does not involve
judgments, hearings, or punishments; instead, at the conclusion of the review, a
report is published, which includes the state's areas of accomplishments as well as
recommendations for areas that may need improvement. What Is Peer Review?, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/whatispeerreview.htm (last visited July 5, 2015).
38 See Heimann et al., supra note 34, at 8.
39 See Misty Robinson, Global Approach to Anti-Bribery and Corruption, an
Overview: Much Done, but a Lot More to Do, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 311-20 (2012)
(discussing enforcement in the U.S. compared to other countries).
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encourage or incentivize the kind of entrepreneurial innovation that
gave rise to FCPA enforcement.4 0
This intermediate stage of anti-bribery enforcement suffers from
three distinct problems. The first and most obvious is that uneven
enforcement among capital-exporters delays the pace at which the
world's multinational corporations reform their overseas practices;
because companies outside the jurisdiction of the United States,
Germany, and perhaps the U.K. may bribe without fear of penalty, we
can only assume that they are doing so to a significant degree.
Assuming bribery reduction to be a good thing, limited enforcement is
a problem in and of itself.41
Second, the emerging international anti-bribery enforcement regime
is almost exclusively supply-side. While countries like China and
Brazil are notably going through historic changes in the culture and
practice of domestic bribery enforcement, the majority of anti-bribery
enforcement in international business transactions occurs on the
supply side. That is, the law focuses on the supply of bribes - the
multinational corporation entering a foreign market - rather than on
the "demand" of bribes from the host country government officials.42
Companies are therefore penalized for participating in endemic
bribery environments that existed long before the companies arrived
on the scene. Believing that the DOJ's zeal for near-unilateral and
exclusively supply-side enforcement is fundamentally an attack on
their legitimate interests, U.S. businesses launched via the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, an aggressive campaign to reform (or
allegedly weaken) the FCPA.43
4o

See Heimann et al., supra note 34, at 8.

Paul Carrington has also acknowledged the current limitations of public
enforcement. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 142-49.
42 This distinction is often made through use of the terms "active" and "passive"
bribery (corresponding to the supply and demand, respectively). These terms were
defined and implemented into the sphere of bribery law when the European Union
adopted the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union in 1997,
and again when the Council of Europe adopted the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption in 1999. Both Conventions explicitly criminalized active and passive
bribery, but the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption extended this requirement
to forty-seven countries, extending past the twenty-seven countries in the European
Union. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Role of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other
TransnationalAnti-Corruption Laws in Preventing or Lessening Future FinancialCrises,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1301 (2012).
43 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce proposed amendments to the FCPA that would
include a defense of compliance, restrict a company's liability for a subsidiary or actions
that occurred before it acquired a secondary company, creating a definition of "foreign
41
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The third problem may be even more troubling, and springs from
the first two. As I have argued at length in previous articles** and will
only summarize here, both empirical data and basic economic
modeling suggest the alarming possibility that uneven enforcement
might not reduce net levels of bribery in the host country. Indeed, in
certain circumstances, it may actually increase net levels of hostcountry bribery. Consider the perfect storm. Host-country bribery is
systemic, but the host country's laws prohibiting the bribing of its own
officials are not enforced. Foreign companies are entering that host
country and playing by different rules: some firms are subject to their
home country's prohibition on foreign bribery while some are not.
Given poor incomes, pervasive bribery, and a culture of tolerance, the
host country's officials will tend to confer benefits to the bribe-paying
firms. This combination produces the following effect. Where
transactions shift from firms subject to an anti-bribery law to firms not
so subject (what economists have called ownership substitution),45 net
official," and requiring "willfulness" for a corporation to be held criminally liable. See
ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALLXANDRA SMIH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1, 7
(Oct. 2010), https//jenner.com/system/assets/publications/216/originaVRestoringBalance
ProposedAmendments totheForeign-Corrupt PracticesAct.pdf?1318976610.
44 See generally Andrew Brady Spalding, The Problem of Deterring Extraterritorial
White-Collar Crime, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 355 (2014) (arguing that in international
business law, enforcement authority will tend to fail); Andrew Brady Spalding,
Restorative Justice for Multinational Corporations, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 357 (2015)
[hereinafter Restorative Justice], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2403930
(providing a model for extraterritorial white-collar criminal punishment); Andrew
Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as
Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REv. 351 (2010) (proposing
various reforms to the text and enforcement of international anti-bribery legislation to
deter bribery without deterring investment).
45 See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L BuS. STUD.
803, 819 (2006). This also assumes that the enforcement of foreign bribery
prohibitions achieves a measure of success in deterring bribery. Deterrence theories
stem from the notion that law and economics serve to promote social welfare as a
whole, and can be promoted through a series of cost and reward calculations. This
equation is premised upon the idea that individuals will refrain from committing an
illegal act due to their fear of being punished. Once the cost of enforcing and imposing
the punishment is weighed against the burden being placed on the taxpayer, the type
of punishment associated with a crime can be manipulated as to make it the most
effective policy possible. Although this is domestically an effective method, deterrence
in an international setting actually increases crime in developing countries rather than
decreasing it. For one, the punishments associated with certain crimes that are not
equal in severity can encourage individuals to commit the more severe crime since the
ultimate penalty is the same. Second, criminalizing a certain action and increasing the
"price" associated with it can cause individuals to decide to substitute that crime for
another as the penalty is lower. Ultimately, deterrence methods tend to increase crime
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levels in the host country may not go down, and may even go up.
Given the FCPA's unmistakable founding in a concern for overseas
institution-building, an enforcement regime that fails to reduce
bribery, and may actually increase it, is self-evidently ineffective.
As the next section will show, these problems are due in large part
to anti-bribery's undue reliance on public enforcement. Private
enforcement has, in the U.S. context, compensated for similar
shortcomings in the public enforcement of myriad other areas of
white-collar crime. However, appreciating the potential upside of
private anti-bribery enforcement is a necessary precursor to
recognizing the harm of Duty Free.
11.

THE NEED FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

In current global anti-corruption enforcement, states prosecute
natural and legal persons, and states pressure other states to do the
same. But as the following sections will show, the limits on political
will and enforcement resources are themselves characteristics of a
public enforcement regime. Introducing a dimension of private
enforcement would circumvent these problems, while also addressing
demand-side bribery as a counterbalance to the current supply-side
focus, producing a global enforcement regime that more effectively
reduces overseas bribery. Section A describes the U.S. experience in
using concurrent public and private enforcement to achieve public
policy goals, and details its benefits. Section B will briefly describe the
impulse to find a venue for the private enforcement for violations of
the FCPA, and its obvious shortcomings. Section C will introduce
investor-state arbitration as a potential new venue for promoting antibribery norms.
A.

U.S. Experience with ConcurrentPublic/PrivateEnforcement

As explained above, the global anti-bribery enforcement regime was
instigated by passage and then enforcement of the U.S. FCPA. It is a
little-known fact that the FCPA is actually a component of U.S.
securities law; the statute is an amendment to the 1934 Securities and
Exchange Act, thus integrating the FCPA into the context of securities
fraud enforcement and the broader regime of federal white-collar
crime of which it is a part.46 Both U.S. securities enforcement, and
and then place a larger burden on the taxpayer, thereby failing to achieve any of its
goals. See Spalding, RestorativeJustice, supra note 44, at 361-71.
46 The SEC has always had broad jurisdiction over accounting and disclosure
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myriad other areas of federal law, famously rely on a combination of
public and private enforcement.
While concurrent public/private enforcement is deeply embedded in
the federal white-collar regime, this article takes four examples that
especially illustrate the purposes and benefits of dual-enforcement:
securities, antitrust, environmental, and employment law. The benefits
of concurrent enforcement can be sorted into three categories: the first
concerns available funding for enforcement; the second concerns the
substantive knowledge and ideas that private enforcement might
access or generate; and the third concerns political pressures.
The reliance of U.S. securities law on concurrent public/private
enforcement47 resulted from a recognition of the inherent limitations
of public enforcement to address the variety and complexity of
securities transactions. While the government can file civil, criminal,
or administrative proceedings against natural and legal persons,4 8 the
securities laws expressly provide a number of remedies to private
parties claiming damages, 49 and the courts have implied a series of
private rights of action.50 As these implied private rights of action grew
standards of U.S. corporations. The FCPA, as it amended the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, provided the SEC with a broader range of duties, powers, and jurisdiction
that included the ability to combat the bribery of both foreign and domestic officials.
See generally RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 6 (describing the history of the passage of
the FCPA).
47 For an excellent description of the SEC's authority, drafted by a former
commissioner, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
FederalSecurities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 976-1017
(1994).
48 The SEC can prosecute violations of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act") through administrative or civil enforcement proceedings. 15 U.S.C. § 77a
(2012); see id. §§ 78a, 78u, 78aa, 77x, 78ff(a).
49 These include: § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012), which
imposes liability for misstatements or omissions in registration statements; § 12 of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771, which imposes liability for the sale of unregistered
securities and for fraud in the sale of securities; § 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o, which imposes liability on controlling persons; § 9 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78i (2012), which imposes liability for specified manipulations of exchangetraded securities; § 16 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p, which imposes liability
for "short-swing" profits; § 18 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r, which imposes
liability for misleading statements in periodic reports filed with the Commission; § 20
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t, which imposes liability on controlling persons;
and § 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1, which imposes insider trading
liability on contemporaneous traders. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins.,
508 U.S. 286, 294-96 (1993).
50 These include a number of provisions under the Exchange Act: § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993), which establish the
general antifraud provision under the federal securities laws; § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.
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in number and importance, plaintiff lawyers came to be known as
"private attorneys general" (a term first coined in 1943 in a Second
Circuit case51 and used in a U.S. Supreme Court dissent later that
year5 2), so-called because they advance public policy goals embedded
in the securities laws by filing claims against alleged violators,
typically but not exclusively5 3 in the form of class action lawsuits.54
Private enforcement remains highly robust today as legal reforms
have tempered its alleged abuses. The growth of allegedly frivolous
and otherwise abusive private filings in the 1970s and 1980s, and the
explosion in both popular and academic commentary, produced and a
reform movement. The result was the imposition in 1995 of new
procedural barriers including a heightened pleading standard and
mandatory stay on discovery.55 Notably, this movement's aim was the
curtailment of abusive private litigation, but not its elimination.
Scholars continue to acknowledge 56 that owing to the SEC's inherent
constraints - including limited resources, political pressure, and even
the danger of agency capture - private enforcement remains critical
to advancing the public policy goal of promoting transparency and
fairness in the capital markets,57 concurring with the U.S. Supreme
Court that it is a "necessary supplement" to public enforcement.58
§ 78n(a), and Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, prohibiting fraud in the solicitation
of proxies; § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), and Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3,
prohibiting fraud in connection with tender offers; and § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(e)(1), prohibiting fraud in connection with an issuer's repurchase of its own
shares. See Grundfest, supra note 47, at 964.
51 Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943),
vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) ("Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private
Attorney Generals.").
52 FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 239, 265 n.1 (1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
53 In addition to the typical class action lawsuit, private attorneys are sometimes
hired by the U.S. government to litigate on behalf of the public, as occurred in the
tobacco cases and the Microsoft antitrust litigation, and are referred to as private
attorneys general. See Carl W. Hittinger & Jarod M. Bona, The Diminishing Role of the

Private Attorney General in Antitrust and Securities Class Actions Cases Aided by the
Supreme Court, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 167, 170 n.32 (2009).
54 See id. at 168.
55 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101,
109 Stat. 737 (1995).
56 See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring
the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 1Ob-5, 108 COLUM. L.
REv. 1301 (2008) (first characterizing the position that private enforcement is a
"necessary supplement" to public enforcement as "oft-cited, but undertheorized," and
sharply criticizing certain features of private enforcement, but nonetheless proposing
no more radical a remedy than SEC authority to screen class action lawsuits).
57 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post
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The private attorney general is likewise active in the enforcement of
antitrust law. From its onset, federal antitrust enforcement rested
explicitly on both private and public enforcement. While public
enforcement authority is shared by the DOJ and Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"),59 Congress also provided a private right of
action in the federal antitrust laws. These express grants of a private
right of action included the rights to a trial by jury, a provision that
any damages the jury awards are to be trebled by the court, 60 and
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.6 1 Scholars have identified
various purposes of the private right of action. Antitrust violations are
difficult to detect, and private parties may have unique access to
evidence; treble damages provide that incentive to bring the evidence
to light. 62 Obviously, private enforcement aims for general deterrence.
Of particular importance to this paper, the legislative history and case
law make clear that among the most important goals of private
enforcement is compensating the victims of illegal behavior.63 Today,
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008) (arguing the SEC is faced with scarce resources
and agency capture).
58 SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
59 See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the
Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, orJust Right?, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 303, 306
(2004) (describing enforcement responsibilities of the DOJ and FTC).
6o Awards of treble damages are very rare, and scholars surmise that settled cases
rarely involve more than single damages. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis,
Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV.

879, 883 (2008).

61 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
62 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & EcoN.
445, 449-52 (1985) (providing an economic analysis of damages).
63 In 1890, Senator Coke commented upon a bill that provided only for double
damages as follows: "How would a citizen who has been plundered in his family
consumption of sugar by the sugar trust . .. recover his damages under that clause? It
is simply an impossible remedy offered him.... [H]ow could the consumers of the
articles produced by these trusts, the great mass of our people - the individuals - go
about showing the damages they had suffered? How would they establish the damage
which they had sustained so as to get a judgment under this bill? I do not believe they
could do it." 21 CONG. REc. 2615 (1890). Similarly, Representative Webb stated that
the damages provision "opens the door of justice to every man whenever he may be
injured by those who violate the antitrust laws and gives the injured party ample
damages for the wrong suffered." 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914). He also stated that "we
are liberalizing the procedure in the courts in order to give the individual who is
damaged the right to get his damages anywhere. . . you can catch the offender." Id.;
see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("[The treble damages
remedy was passed] as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting
from price fixing."). A large number of Supreme Court cases hold that both deterrence
and compensation are purposes of the treble damages remedy. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield
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the ratio of private to public antitrust litigation is 10 to 1.64 Although
Supreme Court cases of the last decade evidence a skepticism
concerning the private right of action,6 5 scholars have noted that the
Court's concerns are not inherent in the concept of private
enforcement, but instead reflect unique features of U.S. civil procedure
such as notice pleading, broad pretrial discovery, and jury trials.66
Though the private attorney general is perhaps most widely
associated with securities and antitrust enforcement, numerous other
areas of federal law depend just as heavily on private enforcement, and
quite by design. Environmental law, for example, contemplates
private-sector suits of two kinds. First, citizen suit provisions provide
a cause of action for any citizen to file suit against a private, state, or
local entity for noncompliance, provided a public enforcement action
is not already underway. Myriad environmental laws contain citizen
suit provisions. 67 Once a citizen suit is initiated, the Environmental
Protection Agency has a right to intervene and prosecute on behalf of
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 n.20 (1990); California v. ARC Am.
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.,
456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982); Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Ill. Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746, 748-49 (1977); Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 502 (1969); see also Lande & Davis, supra note 60, at 881 n.14.
64 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1159, 1179 (2008).
65 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566-67 (2007); Verizon
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415-16 (2004).
Concerns include the fear of false positives, lack of confidence in judges and juries to
achieve correct outcomes, the difficulty federal judges have in managing the costs of
antitrust litigation, and a preference for regulation over judicial intervention. See, e.g.,
Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American
Experience, 41 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 636 (2010) (examining the private remedy
through the lens of the American system and offering some observations about
designing private remedies schemes in antitrust regimes abroad).
66 See Cavanagh, supra note 65, at 640. A robust academic literature, using
economic methodologies, debates the merits of private enforcement. Some scholars
find that private enforcement has a neutral effect on total enforcement; some find that
it leads to more optimal enforcement; while some contend that private enforcement
negatively affects total antitrust enforcement. See generally id. (discussing the private
right of action).
67 Environmental statutes with citizen suit provisions include: Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (2012); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(1) (2012); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a)(1) (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2012); Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuary Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (2012); Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(a) (2012); Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2012); and
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1349(a)(1) (2012).

2015]

DeconstructingDuty Free

463

'

the government. Citizen enforcers may seek penalties as well as
compliance and mitigation orders, though all penalty money is
deposited with the U.S. Treasury.6 8 Secondly, a party with standing
can sue for judicial review of agency action under section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). APA review actions can
challenge interpretation and implementation of a statute, as well as
failure to take action. 69 Both the legislative and executive branches
have spoken publicly to the importance of private enforcement as a
supplement to public enforcement, in large measure because the
private sector can bring so many more suits, and exert so much more
pressure on would-be violators, than can the public sector. 70 Today,
the number of actions brought by private enforcement actions is
several times that brought by the federal government.7
Likewise, Congress's "massive"7 2 reliance on private litigation to
advance the policy goals of employment discrimination law has
important lessons for anti-bribery enforcement. The modern
employment discrimination regime arose in 1964 with Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.73 Civil rights advocates

wanted strong public

68 See, e.g., Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Law, 68 LAND ECON. 28 (1992) (describing the varying remedies,

limitations, and reimbursement procedures that can affect both the level and patterns
of litigation activity as well as the compliance consequences); Matthew D. Zinn,
PolicingEnvironmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits,
21 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 81 (2002) (arguing that agency enforcement is often preferable to
citizen suit enforcement).
69 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997).
70 See Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Env't and
Natural Res. of the H. Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. 212-13
(1994) (statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement,
Environmental Protection Agency); The Water Quality Act of 1994, and Issues Related to
Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 3948 Before the Subcomm. on Water
Res. and Env't of the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103d Cong. 290 (1994)
(statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency);
Report of the Committee on the Environment, 19 ENERGY L.J. 181, 192 (1998)
("Environmental citizen suits are a very significant aspect of federal environmental
enforcement litigation in terms of both the frequency of these suits and the severity of
the sanctions imposed . . . citizen suit enforcement under . . . federal environmental

statutes, such as the CAA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), is growing.").
71 See, e.g., David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
FederalSystem: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the
United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1609 (1995)
(discussing private and public enforcement).
72 Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement,
17 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 637, 691 (2013).
73 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).

464

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 49:443

enforcement through administrative adjudicative powers, modeled
after the National Labor Relations Board, with no private litigation.7 4
However, the Democratic Party, though it held a majority in both
houses, was divided on the civil rights issue largely between the North
and South. Accordingly, the passage of Title VII depended on
conservative Republicans forming a majority with the non-southern
Democrats.7 5 These Republicans succeeded in stripping the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") of the stronger
enforcement powers that civil rights advocates had sought, thus
expressing their preference for limiting the growth of bureaucracy as
well as their inherent distrust of the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations. Congress thus authorized private lawsuits with
economic incentives such as attorney fee awards for prevailing
plaintiffs. 7 6 Accordingly,

enactment of Title VII depended on a

political horse trade in which Republicans accepted private lawsuits in
exchange for eschewing public bureaucracy.
As civil rights groups saw private litigation grow dramatically in the
following years, they too came to embrace private litigation.7 7 In 1991,
with support of these civil rights groups, Congress augmented the
private enforcement regime by adding compensatory and punitive
damages and the right to trial by jury.78 This choice was again shaped
by the political cleavages in the 1980s between a predominately
Democratic Congress and the Reagan administration. 79 The decision to
pursue private enforcement was thus a result of lack of political will to
buttress public enforcement; this lack of political will was the result of
ideological divisions, inter-branch power struggles, and rising
concerns about the bureaucracy's limited energy, resources, and
innovation.80 Between 2001 and 2010, 17,253 employment
discrimination suits were filed; of these, 98% were privately
prosecuted and a mere 2% were prosecuted by the EEOC or DOJ. 81 To
74 Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 72, at 691. A bill was introduced to this
effect. Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act, H.R. 405, 88th Cong. (1st Sess. 1963).
75 Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 72, at 691-92 (citing SEAN FARHANG,
THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 94
(2010)).
76 Id. at 692 (citing SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 95, 101 (2010)).
77 Id. at 693.
78 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012)).
79 Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 72, at 694.
so Id. at 695.

81 Id.
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the extent one believes that employment discrimination enforcement
has resulted in a reduction in discrimination, compensation to victims,
and changing workforce culture, those gains are due almost
exclusively to private enforcement.
Given a reliance on private enforcement that is both broad and deep,
a robust academic literature has emerged to chronicle and debate the
benefits of private enforcement in its myriad manifestations.82 A
catalogue of these benefits shows just how applicable they are to the
current anti-bribery enforcement regime. These benefits might be
sorted into three categories. As indicated above, the first concerns
available funding for enforcement; the second concerns the
substantive knowledge and ideas that private enforcement might
access or generate; and the third concerns political pressures.
First and most obviously, private enforcement increases the total
amount of enforcement resources available. Government agencies are
inherently constrained by the limitations of public budgets.8 3 Where
private enforcement is robust, the aggregate resources devoted to
enforcement may greatly exceed available public funding; this has
proven especially true in anti-trust enforcement.84 Moreover, where
public enforcement agencies are aware of an effective private
enforcement regime, they may concentrate their efforts in prosecuting
cases that do not hold out sufficient incentives to private litigants.8 5
Put another way, private enforcement distributes the financial burden
of enforcement between public and private sources. This is
particularly attractive where enhancing public enforcement capacity is
either too expensive, or politically unpopular. 86 Although robust
private litigation will increase the courts' docket and therefore the
82

For an excellent summary of the private enforcement literature, see id. at 643-48.

See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1410 (2000);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 12 INT'L REV. L.
ECON. 191, 200 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 221 (1992).
84 See Kent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition
Laws, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 461, 479-91 (1996).
85 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 224-25 (1983);
Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of Private Participationin Regulating and Enforcing
the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J. ENvTL. L.
LITIG. 461, 468-69 (1999).
86 See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 129-71 (2010) (discussing how private enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act furthered civil rights at a time where political support and government
budgetary concerns made public reform unattractive).
&

&
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costs to the public, these costs are not easily traceable by voters and
are therefore more politically viable. 87
Substantively, private enforcement taps into sources of innovation
and substantive knowledge that is not always available to the public
agencies. Private enforcement is widely recognized as encouraging
innovation. Given the inherently bureaucratic, hierarchical, and
politically constrained nature of public enforcement agencies, private
attorneys tend to be far more innovative in the legal theories they
adopt, potentially expanding the strategies that public enforcers adopt,
not to mention the law itself.88 This may be true not only of the

theories of liability and methods of proof, but also of policy
justifications and solutions.89 Similarly, private enforcers often have
access to information that is not available, or at least far less readily
available, to public enforcers. Given that the private litigants have
been directly harmed by the alleged violations and often have
expertise in the industry, they have information that the public
enforcement agencies often could not access through monitoring.9 0
Third, private enforcement is less susceptible to political pressures
that tend to push toward under-enforcement. While regulated
industries tend to oppose enforcement and to readily concentrate their
lobbying efforts, pro-enforcement interests are often more diffuse.
This can result in a disproportionate anti-enforcement influence in the
public arena and perhaps even in agency capture. 91 So too might
periodic political changes result in ideologically-driven episodes in
enforcement. By contrast, private enforcement tends to "produce
durable and consistent enforcement pressure." 92 Private enforcement
can also serve to address issues that public enforcement agencies may
have neglected or overlooked due to political or budgetary constraints.
In so doing, private enforcers can "shame or prod" the public agencies
into action.93 Similarly, private enforcement grants citizens access to
87

Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 72, at 663.

88 See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of
Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403-04 (1998).
89 Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 72, at 664-65.
90 See Pamela H. Bucy, Privatejustice, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5, 8 (2002).
91 See Sanford C. Gordon & Catherine Hafer, Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political
Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 245, 245 (2005);
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1039-40 (1997).
92 Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 72, at 664.
93 Id. at 665 (citing Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 56 (1989)); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of
Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 350 (1991); Zinn, supra note 68, at 133-37.
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opportunities to vindicate their rights, and in so doing increases
democratic participation and enhances institutional legitimacy. Often
the victims of such abuses are otherwise vulnerable and
underrepresented, and thus private enforcement is a rare chance to
have their voices heard and interests protected. 94 Such citizens become
less vulnerable to those momentary political trends that are too often
influenced by lobbying efforts in which they cannot afford to
participate. Private enforcement thus creates a sphere of influence that
is protected from these political pressures. 95
Note the relevance of these benefits to the current conundrum of
anti-bribery enforcement. Uneven enforcement is due in very large
part to constraints on political will and enforcement resources;
circumventing these constraints and augmenting resources are among
the principal benefits of private enforcement. Private enforcement
does not depend on the political will or resource commitment of
public agencies; where a right of action exists, entrepreneurial private
enforcers can seize the opportunity without needing the government's
financial or political support. So too will private enforcers have access
to information that poorly funded public investigative agencies cannot
discover, again compensating for restraints on public resources.
The impulse to augment public enforcement with private
enforcement has found some expression in the anti-bribery context.
Companies have indeed been searching for a venue for private antibribery litigation. But as the next section shows, the efforts have
heretofore been unsuccessful.
B.

The Search for a PrivateEnforcement Venue

Though the FCPA has no private right of action, three forms of
private anti-bribery enforcement have tried to get off the ground.
None has made a major impact in the United States, nor will any have
much impact outside the United States.
94 See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 72, at 666 (citing Susan E.
Lawrence, Justice, Democracy, Litigation, and PoliticalParticipation,72 Soc. Sci. Q. 464,
472 (1991)); Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law
in the PoliticalSystem, 77 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 690, 695 (1983).
95 This literature is not without its critics and detractors. Criticisms of public
enforcement include that it: empowers judges to make policy when they may lack
policy expertise; produces inconsistent rulings from courts; undermines the state's
ability to articulate a coherent regulatory scheme; undermines prosecutorial
discretion; discourages voluntary disclosure and cooperation; weakens legislative and
executive oversight; and lacks democratic legitimacy and accountability. Burbank,
Farhang & Kritzer, supranote 72, at 667.
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Shareholders have availed themselves of two mechanisms of private
securities enforcement: the class action lawsuit and the shareholder
derivative suit. Alleging various claims for common law fraud,
Racketeer Influenced or Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), breach
of fiduciary duties, or other securities law violations, plaintiffs'
attorneys have begun augmenting the public enforcement authority of
the SEC and DOJ. 9 6

However, class actions and, to a lesser extent, shareholder derivative
suits are mainly a U.S. phenomenon. 97 They only seek to hold liable
the very same companies that are already subject to public FCPA
enforcement. While these private enforcement mechanisms surely
enhance public enforcement against U.S. companies, they address
none of the problems of international anti-bribery enforcement. They
do not increase the capacity of other capital-exporters to enforce their
prohibitions, and apply almost exclusively to companies within U.S.
jurisdiction. They do nothing to bring non-U.S. companies within the
ambit of anti-bribery law, and thus neither promote the global
promotion of an anti-bribery norm nor help to ensure that
enforcement actually reduces bribery in developing countries. So too
do they reinforce the current disproportionate focus on bribery's
supply side, an approach of uncertain benefit to the countries where
the bribes occur.
Yet another nascent form of private enforcement has gained some
traction, but is again a uniquely U.S. phenomenon. The FCPA has
been privately enforced under RICO. 98 RICO was passed in 1970 in
96 See, e.g., United States v. Panalpina World Transp. (Holding) Ltd., No. 10-769
(S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/panalpina-world/11-04-10panalpina-world-info.pdf; Complaint at 4-5, Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n v. Baker Hughes Inc., No. H-07-1408 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2007),
available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20094.pdf. Opinion
Procedure Release 08-02 "was issued on a timely basis in the middle of a fast-paced,
dynamically changing competition for a foreign target." See Andrew M. Baker, Michael
J. Barta & Michael G. Pattillo, Jr., Baker Botts Assists Client in Obtaining
Groundbreaking FCPA Opinion Release from the Department of Justice Regarding
InternationalMergers and Acquisitions Allowing a U.S. Company to Compete on a Level
Playing Field, BAKER BOTTS LLP, available at http://files.bakerbotts.com/file-upload/
documents/FCPAOpinionClientUpdatell2.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Historically,
the U.S. allowed private enforcement of corruption claims generally through the False
Claims Act as well as qui tam actions. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 149-54.
97 Martin Gelter, Why Do ShareholderDerivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental
Europe?,37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 843, 847-48 (2012).
98 See generally Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
H§ 1961-1968 (2012) ("RICO"); Notable RICO Decision and Development, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/notable-rico-decision-and-
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response to the growing threat of organized crime in the United States.
It prohibits acts such as illegal gambling, bribery, money laundering,
counterfeiting, and embezzlement, and provides for civil and criminal
penalties for the prohibited activities performed as part of a continuing
criminal undertaking. 99 RICO establishes both criminal and civil
liability, and allows civil prosecution by both the federal government
and by injured private persons.oo Once a person or company has been
subjected to or has resolved a FCPA enforcement action, private
entities, such as injured persons or competitor companies, may bring
RICO claims using the FCPA offense as a predicate act. Though RICO
does not include FCPA offenses as a predicate offense,101 it does list
violations of the Travel Act, 102 which the U.S. government frequently
uses in connection with foreign bribery prosecutions.10 3 While there
have been a few examples of successful litigation of civil suits for
FCPA offenses using RICO, these claims very rarely survive the
pleading stage. 104 RICO, like the class action and derivative suit, does
not seem poised to provide a meaningful supplement to public
enforcement.
Representing yet another tactic, a U.S. congressman has tried, albeit
futilely, to introduce the use of private bribery enforcement to "level
the playing field" by statute. A Democratic congressman from
Colorado introduced in multiple congressional sessions 0 5 a bill that
would create a private right of action under the FCPA. It would grant
the right to persons who are already subject to FCPA jurisdiction to
sue persons who are not subject to FCPA jurisdiction for overseas
development.
99 Id. § 1961 (defining "racketeering activity").
100 Id. §§ 1963-1964.
101 See id. § 1961(1)(B).
102 See id. § 1952(b) (2012).
103 See id. The Travel Act forbids the use of "foreign commerce ...
with [the]
intent to ...
promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on of any unlawful activity," and the
unlawful activity is performed or attempted. Id. § 1952(a).
104 For a counter example, see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362,
582-603 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), in which Chevron Corporation successfully sued Donziger,
an attorney for the indigenous people of the Amazon, for FCPA offenses using RICO.
Chevron alleged, among other things, that Donziger violated the Travel Act and the
Hobb's Act (bribery of a foreign judge, fraud, and extortion) and the court found the
claims sufficient for predicate acts under RICO. Id.
105 See Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531, 112th Cong.
(2011); Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 2152, 111th Cong.
(2009); Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008, H.R. 6188, 110th Cong.
(2008).
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bribery. The bill states that only "foreign concerns" (a term that does
not appear in the FCPA) may be liable,1 06 and defines a foreign
concern as "any person other than" those subject to FCPA
jurisdiction. The plaintiff would have to prove essentially three
elements: 1) that the foreign person made a payment otherwise
proscribed under the FCPA; 2) that the payment "prevented the
plaintiff from obtaining or retaining business for or with any person;"
and 3) that the payment "assisted" the foreign concern in obtaining or
retaining business. 0 7 Damages would be three times either the value
of the business that the defendant gained, by virtue of the bribe, or the
value of the business that the plaintiff lost due to the bribe. 08
This proposal would at least in theory tend toward more uniform
global compliance with anti-bribery laws. It could potentially
compensate for the non-enforcement of other capital exporters and
push toward a more uniform bribery regime for multinational
companies doing business abroad. However, the bill has proven
politically unviable, never making it out of committee.1 09 Far more
preferable would be a venue that already existed and required no
statutory authorization, and which companies could access irrespective
of nationality. Investor-state arbitration just may fit the bill.

C.

Looking to Investor-State Arbitration

Investor-state arbitration represents a kind of "grand bargain" that

capital-importing states make with capital-exporting states, by which
the importing states voluntarily promise to provide legal protections to
foreign capital in order to attract more such capital."o To make that
promise effective, countries will frequently include a commitment to
See H.R. 3531; H.R. 2152; H.R. 6188.
H.R. 3531; H.R. 2152; H.R. 6188.
108 H.R. 3531; H.R. 2152; H.R. 6188
109 See Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 3531, LIBR.
CONGRESS, http//thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HRO3531:@@@X (last visited
Feb. 13, 2013) (explaining that the last major action on this bill was referral to a
House subcommittee); Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009-2010) H.R. 2152,
LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 111 :HRO2152:@@@X (last
visited Feb. 13, 2013) (explaining that the last major action on this bill was referral to
a House subcommittee); Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress (2007-2008) H.R. 6188,
LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl10:HRO6188:@@@X (last
visited Feb. 13, 2013) (explaining that the last major action on this bill was referral to
the House Judiciary).
110 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J.
67, 77 (2005).
106
107
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submit to binding arbitration in a bilateral investment treaty, typically
before tribunals created under the ICSID pursuant to the Washington
Convention,"' or the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules.112
These commitments to settlement disputes by arbitration are
designed to provide a forum less tainted by nationalistic or protective
tendencies of domestic courts. Ultimately, the goal is "the promotion
of the respect for the rule of law,"11 3 thereby "promoting foreign
investment by providing effective protection to foreign investors.""1 4 It
is part and parcel of the broader policy of improving an investment
environment and thereby attracting developed-world capital which
contributes to the economic development of the host state.11 5 In so
doing, it also increases protections for domestic investors by
"increasing the State's general standards of business protection"116
thereby generally promoting the rule of law.
While approximately 20 ICSID and UNCITRAL cases have seen
allegations of corruption, overt judicial reasoning addressing the
corruption claims is scarce. Llamzon speculates that arbitrators
recognize the unfairness of ruling in favor of the plaintiff where almost
certainly both parties consented to and participated in the
corruption." 7 He finds that in arbitration rulings, "the calibration of
right and wrong is often not viewed by those participating in
corruption and by those judging corruption alike solely in terms of
what is legal; and that the moral function of decision-making cannot
be reduced to or articulated in its entirety as legal principles.""18
Where this is true generally, and the arbitrators do not have at their
disposal legal principles that render equitable outcomes, the arbitral
jurisprudence of corruption becomes "jurisprudence confidentielle,"
or "the jurisprudence in the shadows.""l 9 Corruption will be "a
consideration borne in the minds of arbitrators, but the import and
HI See 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 36-40, Mar. 18, 1965, No. 8359, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
112 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, http//www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
en/uncitral texts/arbitration/2010Arbitrationrules.html (explaining that the UNCITRAL
provides a comprehensive set of procedural rules for arbitration).
113 ALoYslus P. L[AMZON, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION ¶
1.23 (Loukas Mistelis et al. eds., 2014).
114 Id. ¶ 1.24.
115 See id. '11.24.
116 Id. 9 1.25.
"7 See id. 18.14.
118 Id. ¶8.22.
119

See id. 18.22.
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effect given to those allegations will remain largely unarticulated in
the final award or decision." 120
This paper seeks to facilitate the process of bringing corruptionrelated arbitral decision-making out of the shadows. It aims to begin
building a jurisprudence that more accurately captures the moral
intuitions of arbitral panels as well as the nuances of global anticorruption policy, and in so doing, turn investor-state dispute
settlement ("ISDS") into an effective forum for the private enforcement
of anti-corruption norms. Were ISDS to become that forum, it would
supply many of the benefits that the United States has seen in
concurrent public/private enforcement. Companies could file claims
irrespective of whether their home country was enforcing its own
foreign bribery prohibition, thus compensating for the lack of political
will that often explains non-enforcement. So too would companies and
their counsel bring financial and other resources to enforcement
irrespective of how well-resourced other states' enforcement efforts may
be. In both these ways, investor-state arbitration would "level the
playing field" by bringing more actors within the jurisdiction of antibribery enforcement. To the extent that the defendants were states,
arbitration would also compensate for the present disproportionate
focus on supply-side bribery.
But constructing an alternative to the Duty Free logic will require
attacking each of three legs on which it now rests.
Ill.

NEUTRALIZING DUTY FREE

The previous section argued that global anti-bribery enforcement
now needs private enforcement, that companies have been searching
for it, and that investor-state arbitration could serve that purpose.
However, the obstacle now standing in the way of realizing
arbitration's potential for private anti-bribery enforcement is Duty
Free. This section exposes both the flaws of Duty Free's holding and its
dangers. Section A briefly describes the facts and holding of the
arbitral award, and the dangerous trend that it has already produced.
Section B identifies and deconstructs the three-legged stool on which
the Duty Free award rests. Section C begins to sketch an alternative
structure that would better support global anti-bribery policy.

120

Id. 9 8.25.
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Duty Free's Danger

The danger of Duty Free lies not just in the weakness of its holding.
Rather, it also lies in the prospect of subsequent tribunals relying on
its holding, even in the face of materially different facts and applicable
law. This prospect has already reared its head.
In Duty Free, the claimant World Duty Free ("WDF") was a
company incorporated under the laws of the Isle of Man and owned by
Nasir Ibrahim Ali. 121 WDF had concluded an agreement in 1989 with
the Kenya Airports Authority, acting on behalf of the government of
Kenya, for the construction, maintenance, and operation of duty-free
complexes at Nairobi and Mombassa International Airports. 122 WDF
also entered into a ten-year lease for the complexes that was to last
from 1990 to 2000. WDF was to pay the government $1 million per
year for rent, and WDF spent about $27 million to renovate the
airport terminal.123 Ali freely admitted that he made a "personal
donation" of $2 million to the Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi,
which Ali had been advised was "required" as part of the
"consideration" for the agreement.124 Unique among ISDS cases was
the plaintiffs admission that he had been advised to bribe the
President, and that he had indeed paid the bribe. Duty Free is
ultimately noteworthy because it involved a contract with the host
government for a legitimate purpose, and the outcome of the case was
based on an affirmative finding of bribery. 125
While the parties heavily disputed what happened next and why,
there was no dispute as to the ultimate fate of this transaction. Kenya
eventually placed the duty-free complexes into receivership and then
expropriated WDF's investment completely. 126 WDF then filed a claim
121 World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 1 62-64
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007). Ali personally owned 10% of the company's
shares, and the remaining 90% were registered under the entity Dinky International
SA, 90% of whose shares Ali owned (with his wife owning the remaining 10%).
122

123

Id. 9 62.
Id. 7162, 67.

124 Id. 9 66. The bribe money was brought to Mr. Moi in a suitcase and left in
his
office. When Ali retrieved the suitcase, he found that the cash had been replaced with
ears of corn, a sign of the President's acceptance of the business proposition. Id. '1 130.

125

See id.

T11 130-181.

See id. 1 74. The disputations as to this sequence of events is most colorful. Ali
contended that Moi and his government used WDF without Ali's knowledge or
consent to perpetrate an international fraud designed to raise campaign funds from
foreign sources for Moi's re-election campaign. Ali further alleged that when he was
made aware via media inquiries of Moi's use of his company, Ali objected, and only
then did the government begin the process of seizing ownership and control of his
126
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in arbitration alleging a number of violations of the original
contract. 127
Kenya argued that the agreement was unenforceable by virtue of
Ali's bribe to Moi. It observed that Kenyan law criminalized the
"corrupting" of government officials,12 8 framing this transaction as a
corrupt, aggressive bribe-payor tempting an otherwise innocent
government official. It neglected to mention that the solicitation of
bribes is also criminal under Kenyan law. WDF countered that making
such payments to President Moi was routine practice in Kenya, rooted
in cultural practices of "Harambee"l 29 and widely regarded as a
"matter of protocol" among the Kenyan people, even to the point that
Kenya's "domestic public policy" made such personal donations "not
only acceptable, but fashionable."130
As the subsequent section will break down in detail, the tribunal's
ultimate award rested on the interplay between three asserted legal
principles. First, there exists a transnational public policy against
bribery.131 Second, while Ali and President Moi both participated in
the bribery (in contravention of public policy) Ali's conduct was
attributable to WDF but Moi's conduct was not attributable to the
Republic of Kenya.1 32 Third, as a matter of contract law, the bribe
rendered the agreement illegal.1 33
Standing alone, Duty Free would likely do little harm. But in a
subsequent arbitration award in which corruption was also "explicitly
outcome-determinative,"134 the tribunal relied heavily on Duty Free's
logic, thus beginning a dangerous pattern. Metal-Tech v. Republic of
Uzbekistan 35 differed from Duty Free in important respects: it was
company. Kenya responds that Ali defaulted on rent payments and that Ali's home

country of the UAE had issued an arrest warrant for financial fraud Ali allegedly
committed in that country. Id. ¶T 66-72, 83-85.
127 Id. 174.
128 Id. 1106.
129 See id. T1 120, 133. "Harambee" means "let's pull together" in Swahili and refers
to the Kenyan tradition of mobilizing community resources to tackle social problems,
in particular to finance community projects. See id.; see also HARAMBEE,
www.harambeeproject.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) (defining "Harambee" under
mission statement).
130 World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 9 120
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
131 Supra PartL.A.
132 Infra Part Ill.A.2.
133 Infra Part 111.A.1.
134 LLAMZON, supra note 113,9 6.43.
135 Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, (Oct. 4,
2013).
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based on a treaty rather than a contract, and did not involve the laws
of England, much less Kenya. Nevertheless, the judgment seemed to
rely heavily on Duty Free's holding, thus demonstrating the
importance of redirecting this area of arbitration jurisprudence.
Claimant Metal-Tech was an Israeli company that entered into a
joint venture ("JV") with two Uzbek State-owned companies related to
mineral production. The joint venture became the subject of criminal
proceedings related to the misconduct of its officials, after which the
Uzbekistan government abrogated the JV's right to purchase raw
materials and cancelled Metal-Tech's exclusive right to export the JV's
refined product. One of the two state-owned JV partners then
terminated its contract with the JV and initiated bankruptcy
proceedings, during which the state-owned partners' claims were
accepted while Metal-Tech's were rejected. 136 Metal-Tech then
initiated arbitration proceedings under the Israel-Uzbekistan BIT,
alleging that Uzbekistan breached its obligations under both Uzbek
law and the BIT. Uzbekistan countered that the arbitration panel
lacked jurisdiction because Metal-Tech's investment was obtained by
and operated through bribery.137 In particular, Metal-Tech had paid
extraordinarily large amounts of money under the guise of
"consultancy agreements" to several individuals, one of whom was the
brother of the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan. Finding the payments
extraordinary in their amount, the lack of evidence showing that the
consultants actually provided services, and the consultants' lack of
qualifications, the tribunal concluded that the agreements were a
"sham," amounting to bribery. 138
Because the bribery violated Uzbek law, the arbitral panel followed
the Duty Free precedent in concluding that a claimant who
participated in bribery could state no claim for relief, even where the
host state's public officials were complicit. 139 Further mirroring the
prior decision, the Metal-Tech panel acknowledged the apparent
unfairness of this holding to the claimant: "[ilt is true that the
outcome in cases of corruption often appears unsatisfactory because,
at first sight at least, it seems to give an unfair advantage to the
defendant party."140 Nonetheless, the panel adopted precisely the
position of the Duty Free panel, that "the idea, however, is not to
punish one party at the cost of the other, but rather to ensure the
136 Id. 19 37-53.
137
138

Id. ¶9 107-110.
Id. 19 199-218.

139 LLAMZON,

supra note 113,

9 6.56.

14 Metal-Tech Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, ¶ 389.
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promotion of the rule of law, which entails that a court or tribunal
cannot grant assistance to a party that has engaged in a corrupt act." 14 1
Though not involving English or Kenyan law, or implicating the law
of contract, the Metal-Tech holding exactly parallels Duty Free. In so
doing, it creates the very same problems for global anti-corruption
policy. If arbitration is to become an effective venue for the litigation
of corruption-related claims, the slate must be wiped clean. The next
section undertakes to do so.
B.

Deconstructingthe Three-Legged Stool

Doctrinally, the Duty Free award rests upon a three-legged stool: 1)
global anti-corruption policy; 2) state liability for official bribery; and
3) the law of contract. This subsection deconstructs each of these legs,
one at a time.
1.

The Common Law of Contract: Reclaiming Restitution

Owing to the agreement's choice of law provisions, the contracts
issues were analyzed under the English common law of contracts.14 2 A
foray into traditional English common law contracts doctrine renders
a subtle, and underappreciated, error in the Duty Free award. The
panel held that the contract between the claimant and the Republic of
Kenya was both voidable and illegal. The former is right, but the latter
represents a misapplication of English contract law. The difference is
not merely technical or academic. Were Ali's contract with Kenya
deemed voidable, and not illegal, he could still have stated a claim
under an alternative theory of contract (or quasi-contract): unjust
enrichment. Recognizing the potential validity of an unjust
enrichment claim even where the contract is admittedly procured by
bribery would direct the arbitration jurisprudence of corruption along
a very different path.
The panel relied on the prominent English contracts treatise, Chitty
on Contracts, 43 for its discussion of illegality. It might have read the
treatise just a bit more deeply. The panel first addresses illegality,
noting that a contract may be illegal in formation or performance.144
The doctrine of illegality at formation applies if "in all the
141

id.

142 See World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 9 159

(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 1.L.M. 339 (2007). The law of Kenya was also invoked, but as a

commonwealth country, English law was deemed the law of Kenya.
143 C
rITTY
ON CONTRACTS (H.G. Beale et al. eds., 30th ed. 2008).
144 World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 9 161.
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circumstances it would be an affront to public conscience to grant the
plaintiff the relief which he seeks because the court would thereby
appear to assist or encourage the plaintiff in his illegal conduct."145
The panel finds that because Ali freely chose to invest in Kenya and
was advised of the prevalence of bribery, he "chose, freely, to pay the
bribe," and now granting him relief for breach of such a contract
would "appear to assist and encourage the plaintiff in his illegal
conduct," thus committing the proscribed affront.146
However, though the panel rightly acknowledged the important
distinction between illegality at formation and at performance, it did
not apply the distinction correctly. The same treatise on which the
panel relied, Chitty on Contracts, explains the distinction further.
Illegality at formation means that it cannot be performed without
committing an illegal act.1 47 An example that Chitty provides is a
contract for a theater production to be performed without a license
when such licenses were required by law; the parties knew at the
formation stage that the contract was for an illegal purpose.148 By
contrast, a contract is illegal as to performance when one or both
parties intends to perform an otherwise legal contract in an illegal
manner.1 49 Chitty cites as an example a contract to transport some
equipment; the contract was not itself illegal, but when the mover
used a vehicle that could not legally handle the weight, the contract
became illegal as to performance.150
The contract at issue in Duty Free was neither: it was neither illegal
at formation nor at performance. Both categories illegal at
formation and at performance - go to the good or service to be
provided under the contract, not the manner in which the contract
was formed. Illegal at formation means that the good or service to be
provided under the contract was inherently illegal, not that the
manner in which the contract was formed was illegal. The contract in
Duty Free did not concern an object that was inherently illegal: that
object, namely, was an otherwise valid license to legally operate a
duty-free complex in an airport. Neither did the parties allege that this
valid and legal agreement became illegal upon performance. Rather,
the only wrongful act here was the manner in which the contract was

145

Id. 11161.

146 Id.A 178.
147 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 143, § 16-008.
148 See id. (citing Levy v. Yates, 8 A. & E. 129
(1838)).
149
150

Id. § 16-009.
Id. § 16-0010.
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initially formed, and this is not what the doctrine of illegality concerns
in the English common law of contract.
Perhaps fortunately for the panel, illegality was not the only
principle of contract law on which it relied. The other, voidability,
proves far stronger, and this has much significance for the ruling's
anti-corruption implications. The panel explains at some length the
difference between a void and a voidable contract. A void contract
appears to satisfy the elements of a contract but "is in reality so
defective as to make it entirely ineffectual in the eyes of the law. It is
from the outset empty of content." 151 A voidable contract, by contrast,
is "intrinsically valid" but due to the "circumstances of its making" the
court will not enforce it.152 Here, the injured party has the option of
rescinding the contract, but the contract is not inherently void. For
that reason, the claimant must take a "positive action to set it aside"
but has the option of waiving his right to rescind, and keeping the
contract in force.153 Perhaps surprisingly, given its previous finding
that the contract was illegal, the panel found that Kenya "formally
avoided the [a]greement" in submitting its Counter-Memorial,1 54
apparently concluding that the contract between Ali and Kenya was
voidable, and not void. That is, the agreement was not inherently
ineffectual and unenforceable, but was unenforceable at the discretion
of the respondent and upon its affirmative act of avoidance. 155
While the distinction between void and voidable is not important
for present purposes, 5 6 the contrast with illegality most certainly is: it
matters for purposes of restitution. Under the English common law of
contract, a claimant cannot recover under a contract if that contract is
deemed illegal. But where the contract is avoided, the claimant can
recover under restitution principles. 157 Though the panel did not
address restitution, it made clear that this was only because the
151

World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7,

152

Id

91164.

Id.
Id. 1 182.
155 For a more general discussion of the harms to anti-corruption policy that come
from deeming contracts induced by bribery invalid, see generally Mathias Nell,
Contracts Obtained by Means of Bribery: Should They Be Void or Valid?, 27 EUR. J.L.
ECON. 159 (2009).
156 It may be important in contract negotiations. See Olaf Meyer, The Formation of a
TransnationalOrdre Public Against Corruption:Lessons for andfrom Arbitral Tribunals,
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLIcY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE?
229, 241 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013).
157 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 143, § 29-077 (citing Parkinson v. Coll. of
Ambulance Ltd., 2 K.B. 1 (1925)).
153
154
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claimant had not pled it. 158 This is a most unfortunate strategic choice
on the part of the claimant's counsel.
Restitution is a claim distinct from contract, sometimes called
"quasi-contract." As an oft-cited English jurist explained,
any civili[zled system of law is bound to provide remedies for
cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust
benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of,
or some benefit derived from, another which it is against
conscience that he should keep . .. Such remedies in English

law are generically different from remedies in contract or in
tort, and are now recognilz]ed to fall within a third category of
the common law which has been called quasi-contract or
restitution. 159
Restitutionary remedies are thus available where the defendant has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of the claimant. Restitution
differs from contract in that the liability is imposed on the defendant
"irrespective of the agreement of the parties."160 Moreover, at common
law the defendant's duty to provide restitution may be based upon the
involuntariness of the transfer. 161 Note the obvious relevance to the
Duty Free facts.
The Duty Free panel hinted that any potential restitution claim that
Ali might have made (had he so pled) would depend on the existence
of a "legal or equitable property interest" that would in turn require
establishing title "without relying on his own illegality."1 62 However,
the panel failed to recognize that a legitimate property interest is but
one of several principles on which restitution may be awarded, and is
conceptually distinct from unjust enrichment. English law now
recognizes several distinct principles upon which restitution may be
granted: unjust enrichment is one; the existence of a legitimate
property interest with which the defendant has interfered is another.1 63
Whether founded upon unjust enrichment or a legitimate property
interest, the elements of restitution are quite simple: the defendant's
enrichment by the receipt of a benefit; the enrichment occurred at the
158 See World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶ 184.
159 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 143, § 29-001 (citing Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna
v. Fairbaim Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. A.C. 32, 61 (1943)).
160 Id. § 29-002. At equity, restitution has been awarded in particular where the
defendant can be said to have exploited the claimant. See id. § 29-003.
161 Id. § 29-002.
162 World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 1162.
163 CHITTY oN CONTRACTS,

supra note 143, § 29-017.
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claimant's expense; the retention of the enrichment must be deemed
unjust; and the absence of a defense or bar to the claim.1 64 English
courts have recognized a variety of grounds on which the enrichment
may be deemed unjust, including the defendant's unconscionable
conduct. 6 5
The potential applicability of this doctrine to the Duty Free facts is
striking. The claimant could have, and likely should have, pled that
the Republic of Kenya was enriched by expropriating the duty-free
complex; that it did so at the claimant's expense; and that retention of
that investment, absent the showing of a legitimate reason, was unjust.
Given a broader policy of promoting foreign investment, such
expropriation constitutes unconscionable conduct. The fact that the
original contract was obtained by bribery would in no way undercut
these claims; restitution does not depend on the existence of an
enforceable underlying agreement. Neither would the claimant have to
demonstrate that it had obtained title to the duty-free complexes
without relying on illegality; the claimant would be relying on unjust
enrichment principles rather than on the legality of the contract that
granted him the property interest. That contract may very well be void
or voidable, but this in no way precludes the claimant from pleading a
valid unjust enrichment claim.
The Duty Free facts could easily have given rise to an alternative
theory of contract in which the claimant had a protectable interest
even though the contract was obtained by bribery. That it did not was
due in part to the unfortunate strategic choices of claimant's counsel
and the limited contractual analysis of the panel. Neither should now
control the future validity of corruption claims in arbitration.
2.

State Liability for Official Bribery: The ILC Articles

The panel also held that the state was not liable for the conduct of
President Moi. This leg of the Duty Free stool proves no less faulty.
The state liability rationale has three potential sources of legal
justification: English and Kenyan law; the arbitral precedents; and
international law. None of them can justify the panel's holding.
The tribunal finds that Moi "received"1 66 (note the emphasis here on
passive receipt rather than active solicitation) Ali's bribe and that

Id. § 29-018.
Id. § 29-028 (citing Rowe v. Vale of White Horse DC, [2003] EWHC (Admin)
388, [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 418 (Eng.)).
166 World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶ 169.
164
165
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Moi's receipt is "not legally to be imputed to Kenya itself."16 7 It first
held that "[there is no warrant at English or Kenyan law for
attributing knowledge to the state (as the otherwise innocent
principal) of a state officer engaged as its agent in bribery." 68 The
panel put the burden of persuasion on WDF to show that the bribery
could be attributed to the State; in the absence of any specific law on
point concerning the State's liability, the panel assumed that the act
could not be thus attributed to the State. This reflects a curious and
unfounded choice by the panel. Though it may well be true that no
"warrant" existed in English or Kenyan law for holding the State
liable, neither did the panel provide a warrant for not holding the State
liable. That is, the law appears neutral on this point: the Kenyan
Constitution and national legislation appear to be largely silent on
whether and when the State is liable for the conduct of its officials. 69
Neither does English law appear to address the issue conclusively.1 70

167 See id. ' 168. The opinion asserts, but does not explain, that a covert payment
by definition cannot be attributed to the State. Further, because the payment was
covert, the Republic did not make an affirmation or waiver of the bribery; while Moi
knew of the bribery scheme, the State did not. See id. ¶ 184.

168

Id. ¶ 185.

The Constitution of Kenya, while qualifying that its provisions are considered
superior to customary international law in Kenyan courts, nonetheless states, "The
general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya." CONSTITUTION,
art. 2 (2010) (Kenya). In addition, the government is bound by the judgment
rendered in ICSID arbitrations. The Arbitration Act, (2012) Cap. A 4/95 § 41 (Kenya);
see also Investment Disputes Convention Act, (2012) Cap. 522 § 4 (Kenya) ("An
award rendered pursuant to the Convention, and not stayed pursuant to the relative
provisions of the Convention, shall be binding in Kenya, and the pecuniary
obligations imposed by the award may be enforced in Kenya as if it were a final decree
of the High Court.").
170 The State Immunity Act ("Act") is the primary legislation controlling issues of
state liability in English law. Section 1(1) of the Act grants general immunity to a foreign
State within English courts unless the conduct of the State falls within enumerated
exceptions described in subsequent sections of the Act. State Immunity Act 1978, c. 33,
§ 1. Relevant to World Duty Free, "[wihere a State has agreed in writing to submit a
dispute which has arisen, or may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects
proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom which relate to the arbitration." Id. §
9(1). The statutory language suffers no defect in clarity; English courts have consistently
held "the Act is as plain as plain can be." AI-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait (No. 2),
[19961 107 I.L.R. 536, 549 (Eng. A.C.).
The Act contemplates that the scope of the "State" extends to "include references to
(a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity; (b) the government
of that State; and (c) any department of that government." State Immunity Act § 14. In
practice, English courts regard heads of State as servants or agents of the State such
that their conduct renders the State liable under the Act. See, e.g., R. v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C.
169
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The panel thus provided no legal basis for placing this burden on the
claimant. Frankly, it seems to represent a smuggled-in policy
preference for releasing the state from liability for its official's bribery.
A second potential legal foundation for not holding Kenya liable for
Moi's acts -

one which the Duty Free panel did not use -

would be

the precedents in investor-state arbitration; but these provide no help.
Two arbitration cases touched on the issue of state responsibility, but
neither ultimately resolved the substantive question of whether a state
official's solicitation and/or acceptance of a bribe can be attributed to
the state. 171 Another case dealt with solicited but unconsummated
147 (H.L.), '1 270 (appeal taken from Eng.). This approach parallels traditional
English tort liability theory, which holds the Crown jointly and severally responsible
"in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents." Crown Proceedings Act,
1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, § 2(1)(a).
Reading § 9(1) and § 14 together, nothing in the Act immunizes the State from
liability in an international investor-state arbitration if, according to § 9(1)(a), the
head of State acts in his or her public capacity. Few English cases, however, have
addressed what constitutes a servant or agent of the State acting in a public capacity.
The English Court of Appeal (Civil) has suggested that State liability is not imputed
from a State agent who violates the law while acting in a private undertaking. See
Propend Finance Pty. Ltd. v. Sing, [1997] 111 I.L.R. 611, 613-14 (A.C.). Prior to
passage of the Act, the House of Lords had immunized the State from responsibility
where public officials were not engaged in a private undertaking. See Rahimtoola v.
Nizam of Hyderabad, [19581 A.C. 379, 395-96 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
English common law recognized absolute state immunity when Rahimtoola was
decided, whereas the Act permits state liability through its enumerated exceptions. See
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, '1 9-10 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(upholding state immunity where claims did not fall within any of the Act's
enumerated exceptions). English law, however, has not addressed State liability where
a claim falls within the enumerated exception and the State agent acts in a public
capacity. See generally Zachary Douglas, State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials,
82 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 281 (2012), available at http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
content/82/1/281.full#xref-fn-4-1.
17i Southern Pacific Properties v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/3, (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 189 (1995), is the earliest case that Llamzon
reports on where an ICSID tribunal addressed corruption to any significant degree.
There, a Hong Kong company and an Egyptian public sector entity formed agreements
to develop two tourist complexes in Egypt. When ancient artifacts were discovered in
the area to be developed, the Egyptian government cancelled the project and placed
the venture in trusteeship. When the claimant alleged an illegal expropriation, Egypt
raised the defense that the venture had been formed through bribery. The majority
ultimately declined to address the corruption claims either factually or legally, though
the dissent argued at length that Egypt had met the burden of proof and that the panel
should have addressed the legal implications of bribery. See LLAMZON, supra note 113,
'l 6.71-6.80. Similarly, in Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v.
Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, (Aug. 16, 2007), (ICSID
2007), a German company invested in a Philippine company for the construction of
an airport terminal. For a variety of reasons, the Philippine government eventually
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corruption, and produced a holding that juxtaposes with Duty Free in
the most curious of ways. Atypically, it was the investor, and not the
state, who alleged corruption, and did so as his principal claim rather
than as a defense. The claimant, a UK investor, alleged that the thenPrime Minister of Romania solicited a $2.5 million bribe after forming
the original agreement related to the operation of duty-free stores. 7 2
When the investor declined to pay the bribe, the government allegedly
changed the regulations concerning duty-free complexes so as to
effectively expropriate the claimant's investment." 3 Ultimately the
tribunal concluded that the claimant had not met his burden of proof
with respect to bribery solicitation." However, the panel conceded
that the solicitation of a bribe, if proven, would constitute a violation
of the fair and equitable treatment obligation under the BIT as well as
a violation of international public policy. 1 75

This precedent actually cuts against the Duty Free holding: it
suggests that the state should indeed be held liable for the bribery
solicitation of its head of state. Though EDF v. Romania is materially
different in that the claimant had not participated in the bribery
scheme, that fact alone may not require a different outcome.
Nonetheless, the difference underscores the "near-singularity of World
Duty Free in the case law.""7 6 The arbitral precedents ultimately

provide no guidance on the question presented in Duty Free: whether
the state should be liable for the bribery of its head of state where the
private party was complicit in the bribery.
voided the agreement, and the German investor sued for breach of the investment
treaty. The Philippines government alleged that the German investor had engaged in
various forms of corruption in violation of Philippine law, thus taking the investment
outside the protections of the investment treaty. The claimant argued that the
government was estopped from asserting the illegality defense because it knew the
agreements were illegal. However, the tribunal held that because the agreements were
covert, and not generally known to the relevant government agencies, the State did
not have knowledge of the transaction and therefore the estoppel argument fails. See
LLAMZON, supra note 113, 11 6.169-6.190.
172 EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award 91 71 (Oct.
8, 2009).
173 See id.¶ 69.
17
175

Id. 9 237.

Id. 91 221. Notably, because the panel ultimately found that the claimant had not
met his burden of proof, its statements concerning state responsibility are dicta. So too
are they basically asserted, with virtually no supporting argumentation. While the
principle thus endorsed in dicta is normatively agreeable to this author, it must be
conceded that the case hardly provides a bedrock precedent for anti-corruption law in
international arbitration.
176 LLAMZON, supranote 113,9 10.26.
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A third potential source of law on state responsibility for corruption
is international law, particularly the United Nations' International Law
Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts.1 77 Although the ILC Articles were drafted in the form
of a treaty but never adopted,1 78 "international courts and tribunals
have applied the Articles virtually in full, treating them as a functional
equivalent
of the
customary international
law on State
responsibility."1 7 9 The ILC Articles lay out general principles of state
responsibility for wrongful acts, without specifying particular kinds of
violations (such as corruption).
The Duty Free panel did not rely upon the ILC Articles, or any other
source of international law, in its award; why it avoided this area of
law is unclear. Part, but only part, of the answer is that the contract at
issue contained a choice of law provision that specified English and
Kenyan law. And Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that
"[tihe Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of
law as may be agreed by the parties." 80 However, this does not
necessarily preclude application of the articles insofar as they
constitute customary international law. While the tribunal was thus to
apply English and Kenyan law, customary international law can be
deemed a part of English law.' 8 ' So too does the Kenyan Constitution
177 Id. 9 10.59 (quoting Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Rep. on the Work of Its FiftyThird Session, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, cmt.150 at
46 (2001)).
178 See Daniel Bodansky et al., The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The
Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 857, 872-73
(2002).
179 LLAMZON, supranote 113, 9 10.12.

180 INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID/15, ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS AND RULES, art. 42(1) (Apr. 2006).
181 In the case of World Duty Free, the issue turns on whether the ILC Articles are
considered customary international law such that the arbitration panel should have
consulted their guidance when determining whether the President implicated the
Kenyan government when soliciting bribes from the WDF investor. The Arbitration
Tribunal has held up the ILC Articles in the past as a "fair expression" of customary
norms in international law but not customary international law per se such that
arbitrators are compelled to apply ILC Articles when gaps in the applicable State law
are present. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
168, available at
(June 29, 2010) 1
ARB/02/16, Annulment Proceeding
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho
not
ILC Articles, although
("[Tihe
wDoc&docld=DC1550_En&caseld=C8
constituting a source of customary law still ... represents a fair expression of such
law . . . ."). Where gaps ("lacunae") in the applicable body of law specified in the
choice-of-law provision of either an international arbitration treaty or concessions
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provide that the "general rules of international law shall form part of
the law of Kenya." 8 2 Accordingly, it appears that the panel made a
conscious decision to stay away from international law generally and
the ILC Articles specifically when deciding the question of Kenya's
liability for Moi's solicitation and acceptance of the bribe.
The omission is regrettable,183 because reliance on the ILC Articles
would have produced a very different precedent. Under the ILC
Articles, the conduct of any State organ is attributable to the State,
irrespective of whether the organ exercises executive, legislative,
judicial, or any other functions.184 This is true regardless of the
official's level of authority within the agency, be it high-level or lowlevel. 18 5 That is, whether a head of state such as Moi or a low-level
administrator or clerk engages in the corruption is irrelevant for
attributing responsibility to the State.
Because corruption is generally defined as the abuse of public office
for private gain,1 86 corruption by definition involves a personal
motivation for the wrongful conduct, that is, a motivation to benefit
contract are present, customary international law acts as a gap filler pursuant to ICSID
Art. 45(1). See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment
Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 175, 176 (2007); see also LLAMZON, supra note 113,

I 10.28 n.51 (citing W. Michael Reisman, The Regime for Lacunae in the ICSID Choice
of Law Provision and the Question of Its Threshold, 15 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 362
(2000)) (explaining that an ICSID panel should apply international law, inter alia,
where the law of the contracting State party to the dispute calls for the application of
international law, including customary international law, and where the subject
matter of the dispute is directly regulated by international law).
182 CONSTITUTION, art. 2 (2010) (Kenya).
183 See LLAMZON, supra note 113, cl 10.29.

184 Article 4 reads in full, "The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an
act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central
Government or of a territorial unit of the State." Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongful Acts, with Commentaries, in Rep. on
the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, ch. IV.E.1, art. 4 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Report].
185 Id. at 31, 39 1 5 (2001) (citing LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Provisional
Measures,
1999 I.CJ. Reports 9, at 16 9 28 (Mar. 3, 1999)).
186 The language was adopted by the World Bank and is considered the most
common substantive legal definition of corruption in circulation. Alternatively, Black's
Law Dictionary defines corruption more precisely as "a fiduciary's or official's use of a
station or office to procure some benefit either personally or for someone else,
contrary to the rights of others." Minor variants of either definition appear in various
legal contexts and scholars disagree whether either is an adequate representation of
the term. See Spalding, Corruption,supra note 6, at 1388-90 (tracing and analyzing the
intellectual roots of modern definitions of corruption and proposing a new definition).
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personally and privately rather than for the benefit of the state. Such
personal motives however do not take the conduct outside of the ILC
Articles. The Commentary to the ILC Articles makes this clear: "It is
irrelevant . .
that the person concerned may have had ulterior or
improper motives or may be abusing public power. Where such a
person acts in an apparently official capacity, or under colour of
authority, the actions in question will be attributable to the State."1 87

The comment cites prior cases to explain that public conduct that is
abused for private gain is different from private conduct,1 88 and cross
references a separate Article which provides that an official's conduct
"shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the
organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its
authority or contravenes instructions."1 89 Indeed, this section almost
seems to be drafted with corruption in mind.
Note that these passages are entirely consistent with the dicta in
EDF, in which the panel agreed with the Claimant that the
unconsummated solicitation of a bribe should be attributed to the
state (but found that the Claimant had failed to meet the standard of
proof for the bribery). Why the Duty Free panel ruled otherwise where
the act of bribery was consummated is far from clear.
In his leading academic treatise on corruption in arbitration,
Llamzon tries to draw from the ILC Articles an inference that the State
responsibility question does in fact hinge on whether the corruption is
consummated; he argues that the ILC Articles support the holdings of
both EDF v. Romania and Duty Free v. Kenya. That is, though the State
bears responsibility for an unrequited bribery solicitation by one of its
officials, the State is not responsible when the bribe is actually paid:
the payor's participation in the bribe thus strips the solicitor's State of
liability for the State official's solicitation and receipt. Put another way,
although a State is liable when its official solicits a bribe that is not
paid, the State is not liable when its official solicits a bribe that is paid;
the State is liable for unsuccessful solicitation, but not for successful
solicitation. Given the starting point that is plain in the ILC Articles
and acknowledged by Llamzon - that the State is responsible for its
official's abusive acts even when motivated by private gain - this
would seem a formidable task. The chasm between State liability for
an unsuccessful bribe solicitation and lack of liability for a successful
solicitation is wide indeed.
187
188

2001 ILC Report, supranote 184, at 42 1 13.
See id. (citing Francisco Mallkn (United Mexican States) v. United States, 4

R.I.A.A. 173, 173-78 (1927).
189 Id. at 45.
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To bridge that gap, Llamzon makes much of the following comment
to the ILC Articles:
One form of ultra vires conduct covered by article 7 would be
for a State official to accept a bribe to perform some act or
conclude some transaction . . . So far as responsibility for the

corrupt conduct is concerned, various situations could arise
which it is not necessary to deal with expressly in the present
articles. Where one State bribes an organ of another to
perform some official act, the corrupting State would be
responsible either under article 8 or article 17. The question of
the responsibility of the State whose official had been bribed
towards the corrupting State in such a case could hardly arise,
but there could be issues of its responsibility towards a third
party ...190

This comment would seem to admit of a natural and unproblematic
reading. When a State official accepts a bribe - note the word
"acceptance" and not merely "solicitation" - Article 7 would apply.
And Article 7 is precisely the section that explains that an official's act
is attributed to the State "even if it exceeds authority or contravenes
instructions."1 91 Quite simply, this comment clarifies what would
seem to be a rather intuitive notion - that the bribe payor's
participation in the bribery scheme does not strip the soliciting
official's State of responsibility.
The comment further explains that in the rather uncommon
situation in which the bribe payor is not a private citizen but the
official of another State, the bribe payor's State also becomes liable.1 92
That is, State liability attaches for both the official supply and the
official demand of bribes. But the solicitor's State would not be liable
to the payor's State; this could "hardly arise." Rather, the solicitor's
State could be liable to a third party (presumably a private litigant).
Again, this seems a straightforward reading of the comment.
However, Llamzon reads this comment to suggest that the willing
participation of the bribe payor "may" render a different outcome even
where the bribe payor is a private party. He asserts that the willing
participation of the bribe-paying investor, who knows the State official
Id. at 46 n.150; LLAMZON, supra note 113, 1 10.59.
191 2001 ILC Report, supra note 184, at 45.
192 These articles concern conduct directed or controlled by a State. See id. at 47.
Because these articles are invoked in the comment only to describe a bribery
transaction between two states, rather than between a state and a private party, I do
not discuss them at length here.
190
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is acting illegally and for private gain, "arguably negates the
application of ordinary attribution rules." 193 But Llamzon never clearly
explains precisely why this is so - that is, why the payor's complicity
and knowledge of the solicitor's illegality negates State responsibility.
The closest he gets is the recognition that when the payor is another
State, the solicitor's State is not liable to the payor's State. Llamzon
restates that principle to hold that "[tihe corrupt official's acts are not
attributable to the State if the entity invoking such responsibility had
participated in the corrupt conduct" 194 But the comment makes clear
this principle applies only where the "entity" is a State. Importantly,
this principle follows the comment's plain statement that the State
official's acceptance of a bribe would trigger liability under Article 7.
In sum, while Llamzon discusses at some length the distinction
between the presence and absence of a knowing and willing bribe
payor in investor-state transactions, it remains a distinction without a
difference. He simply never establishes the causal link between the
investor's participation and the negation of state responsibility.1 95
In sum, the Duty Free holding on state liability for an official's
corruption appears to have no legal justification. It is not required by
English or Kenyan law; it draws no support in the arbitral precedents;
and international law's principle document on state liability almost
certainly recommends the opposite outcome.
3.

Anti-Corruption Policy: Dislodging Lagergren

The third leg on which the Duty Free holding rests - anticorruption policy - is perhaps the least weak of the three. It, at least,
establishes a solid footing in an accurate account of the global anticorruption instruments. However, the panel's effort to build an
argument upon this footing ultimately fails. The award draws upon
the award of the highly regarded Judge Lagergren, a Swedish jurist,
who developed an early jurisprudence of corruption in a commercial
bribery arbitration case. But in trying to apply the Lagergren logic to
the problem of consummated official bribery, the missile gets
sideways. Not appreciating the critical differences between a

LLAMzoN, supra note 113, 9 10.58.
194 Id. 1 10.62.
193

195 For an argument for the importance of recognizing state responsibility in the
arbitration of corruption claims, but that does not involve the ILC Articles, see Hilmar
Raeschke-Kessler & Dorothee Gottwald, Corruptionin Foreign Investment - Contracts
and Dispute Settlement Between Investors, States, and Agents, 9 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 5,
15-16 (2008).
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commercial contract for the bribery of a government official and a
contract procured by bribery, the Duty Free award undermines the
very policies it claims to advance.
The Duty Free award begins by describing the international (or
"transnational") public policy - which it defines as "an international
consensus as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct"
- against corruption.1 96 It acknowledges the importance of caution in
claiming the "objective existence" of such a policy and, heeding its
own warning, then takes great pains to document that existence. The
panel should be commended for the careful choice of words that
follows. It notes that "bribery or influence peddling, as well as both
active and passive corruption" are prohibited in virtually every
country in the world.1 97 Note the careful attention to what is more
widely described as the "supply side" and the "demand side" of
bribery: both the offering and paying of a bribe as well as the
solicitation and acceptance.1 98 The tribunal then provides a litany of
international anti-corruption conventions to support the objective
existence of a norm against both the supply and demand of bribes.
These include the OECD Convention Against Bribery, several regional
instruments from Europe, the Americas, and Africa, and then
ultimately the U.N. Convention Against Corruption.1 99 Notably, the
Tribunal does not, at the onset, aim to focus its condemnation on
196 World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 9 139
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 1.L.M. 339 (2007).
197 Id. ¶ 142.
198 "Active" bribery refers to the offering and payment, while "passive" refers to the
acceptance; "bribery" and "influence peddling" may refer to either. See id.
199 See id. 1 143-45. See generally United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
Oct. 31, 2003, S. TREATY Doc. No. 109-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (agreeing to adopt
measures to prevent and combat corruption); African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (agreeing to adopt
measures to prevent, detect, punish, and eradicate corruption); Council of Europe:
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, E.T.S. No. 174, available at
http://www.conventions.coe.intffreaty/ENfrreaties/Html/174.htm (agreeing to pass
measures that provide remedies to those who suffer damages as the result of
corruption); Council of Europe: Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27,
1999, E.T.S. No. 173 (agreeing to pass measures criminalizing active and passive
bribery of government officials); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 1.L.M. 4 (agreeing to adopt
standards criminalizing bribery of government officials in international business
transactions, focusing on the supply side of bribery transactions); Organization of
American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-39 (agreeing to enforce standards preventing, detecting,
punishing, and eradicating bribery of government officials).
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either side of the corrupt transaction; it condemns the supply and
demand of bribes alike.
However, the opinion then takes a turn, so subtle that its impact on
the ultimate resolution of the case may at first go unnoticed. Having
documented the transnational public policy, it then cites an impressive
number of arbitral awards where the tribunals had to "consider . .
corruption." 200 It begins with the foundational arbitral award issued in
1963 by the respected Judge Lagergren. 201 That case involved an
agreement between two private parties for the payment of a
commission that, in the course of the arbitral hearing, Lagergren came
to believe would be used in substantial part to pay bribes. 202 In other
words, it was a contract between two private parties to bribe a public
official. Importantly, it was not a contract between a private party and
a government official obtained through bribery. Lagergren concluded
that this contract for the payment of bribes involved "such gross
violation of good morals and international public policy" that the
arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction. 203
But the Duty Free tribunal seemingly fails to appreciate a simple but
profound material difference between the facts before Judge Lagergren
and the Duty Free facts. Because it was a contract for the bribery of an
official, and not a contract with an official procured through bribery, it
involved neither expropriation nor state bribery. Simply put, neither
of the parties was the state, and expropriation by the state was not
implicated. 204 Similarly, the Lagergren holding could not incentivize
the state official's solicitation and acceptance of a bribe because again,
none occurred. While Lagergren's holding disincentivized the supply
of bribes - the panel refused to hear a claim for breach of a contract
for official bribery - it had no bearing on the demand for bribes. Just
as with expropriation, the solicitation and acceptance of a bribe was
not part of the facts that gave rise to Lagergren's jurisprudence.
For both these reasons, the Lagergren holding did not, and could
not, incentivize or protect official bribery. Because the state had not
expropriated property (or, for that matter, done anything else
World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶ 148.
201 The award is reprinted in J. Gillis Wetter, Issues of Corruption Before
200

InternationalArbitral Tribunals: the Authentic Text and True Meaning of Judge Gunnar
Lagergren's 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110, 10 ARB. INT'L 277,282-94 (1944).

See id. at 294.
World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, T 148.
204 The panel observes, without comment, that in Judge Lagergren's facts neither
party to the case had been able to "reap the fruits of his own dishonest conduct by
enriching himself at the expense of the other." Id.
202
203
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wrongful) the state is not reaping a reward from a prior act of bribery
(as occurred in Duty Free). More fundamentally (and obviously), a
state official had not, in the Lagergren facts, solicited or accepted
bribery, so the holding did not serve to provide a defense to state
bribery. In both respects - the absence of both an underlying act of
bribery and a subsequent wrongful state action that flowed from prior
official bribery - the Lagergren logic does not incentivize or protect
official bribery.
As has been widely noted in the commentary, the Duty Free holding
does this very thing. The Republic of Kenya is insulated from the
bribery of its former head of state and is able to keep the $30 million
business it expropriated. While others have objected that Duty Free
protects, if not incentivizes, expropriation, 205 from the perspective of
anti-corruption policy the problem runs far deeper.
Relying on Lagergren, Duty Free exacerbates preexisting problems in
global anti-corruption enforcement. First, it exacerbates the
disproportionate focus on supply-side enforcement. ICSID, like the
DOJ, is left punishing only the supply of bribes to public officials,
leaving the demand untouched. Despite the international instruments'
focus on both the supply and demand side of bribes, and Duty Free's
claim of advancing global policy, Duty Free in fact merely reinforces
existing shortcomings in the global effort to translate policy into
practice.
Second, Duty Free will tend to discourage investment in developing
countries among companies that are subject to a prohibition on
foreign bribery. Indeed, the panel explicitly stated that Ali freely chose
to pay the bribe - that is, was not pressured to pay it by the
government's solicitation - because he freely chose to invest in
Kenya. Put another way, if he wanted to retain his rights in
commercial transactions, he should invest somewhere else. This runs
counter both to the original policies behind anti-bribery law as well as
to the purposes of arbitration: incentivizing foreign investment in
developing countries to build those countries' economies and raise
their legal standards.
Third, the focus on supply-side enforcement, combined with the
discouragement of investing in developing countries, will in turn tend
to exacerbate ownership substitution. Because Duty Free does not
address the demand side, it signals to government agencies that their
205 See Michael A. Losco, Streamlining the Corruption Defense: A Proposed
Framework for FCPA-ICSID Interaction, 63 DUKE LJ. 1201, 1233 (2014) (describing
how investigations by the FCPA could incentivize expropriation of assets and is fueled
partially by the award in Duty Free).
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officials may continue to solicit bribes without fear of being held
accountable in arbitration. Where companies that are reluctant to pay
bribes are discouraged from entering a market, and that market's
officials continue to solicit foreign investment and condition that
investment upon bribes, these conditions will tend to invite companies
from countries that do not enforce foreign bribery prohibitions. As
this article alluded to above and has been demonstrated elsewhere,
this will not always tend to drive down rates of bribery in foreign
countries. Indeed, it may tend to drive them up. And if one assumes
that a corrupt government will tend to perform more poorly for its
citizens, it is precisely those citizens whom the Duty Free logic fails to
help. They become vulnerable to the predations of companies who
bribe without fear of penalty.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that many of the government
officials whom Duty Free protects are themselves charged with
deciding whether to enforce domestic anti-bribery laws. In signaling to
government officials that they will not be held accountable for
soliciting and accepting bribes, so too does it signal that they will
continue to profit from the non-enforcement of their own laws. As one
scholar explained, the state's "monopoly on initiating sanctions under
the criminal law creates a conflict of interest that impedes effective
enforcement." 206 In this way, Duty Free retards the movement toward
effective domestic enforcement that could otherwise counter the
uneven supply-side enforcement and tend to level the playing field.
The panel acknowledged that the effect of its interpretation of the
contract is to provide the Republic of Kenya a complete defense to its
officer's bribery: the head of state solicited and received the bribe, but
the state would keep the expropriated business and the claimant
would lose his $30 million investment. 207 The tribunal noted that it
"remains nonetheless a highly disturbing feature" that the solicitor
and recipient of the bribe was Kenya's head of state, and yet the
Republic of Kenya benefitted from the decision. But, it argued, as a
matter of public policy and its impact on contract law, "the law
protects not the litigating parties but the public; or in this case, the
mass of tax-payers and other citizens making up one of the poorest
countries in the world." 208
206

Abiola 0. Makinwa, Defining a Private Law Approach to Fighting Corruption, in

ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORs PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE?

267, 268 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013).
207 See World Duty Free Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 9 180.

208 Id. '1 180-81. Citing 200-year-old case law, the tribunal maintained that the
validity of this contract interpretation in no way hinged on the injustice of the result
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But this line of reasoning perfectly encapsulates the shortcomings of
Duty Free. However sound Lagergren's logic may be in matters of
commercial bribery, 209 when applied to contracts with the state in
which a state official solicited and accepted a bribe, the Lagergren
logic proves simply disastrous. For the reasons stated above, this logic
will compound the very problems that now plague anti-bribery
enforcement. And it is precisely the citizens of poorer countries who
will bear the brunt of these failures.
CONCLUSION

This article has detailed the systemic weakness of the Duty Free
award, exposing the fundamental flaws in each of its three legal
supports. It has sought to remove the impediment that is Duty Free to
developing the potential of ISDS as a form of private anti-bribery
enforcement. I have been careful to avoid wading into any of the more
technical questions of arbitration procedure, including the issue of
whether corruption relates to the jurisdiction of the panel or the
admissibility of the claim; 21 0 the extent to which the fact-finding
capacities of arbitration tribunals constrain their ability to serve as a
venue of private enforcement;211 or the availability of remedies.
Accordingly, this article does not purport to provide a comprehensive
blueprint for the arbitration of corruption claims; rather, it has
deconstructed the stool that now stands, clearing the way for the
construction of a new and far more effective arbitral jurisprudence of
corruption.

to the claimant; the panel declared the contract null in the name of the public. Id. H
181 (citing Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, 343). It cited a treatise for the
common law principle that a plaintiff whose cause of action arises from the
transgression of a positive law "has no right to be assisted;" that is, because the
plaintiff violated anti-bribery laws in procuring the contract, the agreement is void and
he has no right against the expropriation. The tribunal explained that "[ilt is upon
that ground the court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not
lend their aid to such a plaintiff." Id.
209 See, e.g., Mohamed Abdel Raouf, How Should International Arbitrators Tackle
CorruptionIssues?, 24 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INV. L.J. 116, 119-20 (2009).
210 See, e.g., Zachary Douglas, The Plea of illegality in Investment Treaty
Arbitration,
29 ICSID REV. 155, 177 (2014) (discussing question of admissibility); Divya
Srinivasan et al., Effect of Bribery in International Commercial Arbitration, 42 INT'L J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 131, 132 (2014) (discussing admissibility, arbitrability, and
investigative powers).
211 See Carrington, supra note 2, at 163 (arguing that it would be necessary to
include provisions empowering exposure of governmental records and examination of
witnesses).
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In so doing, it has challenged the claim, perhaps made most
prominently by Jason Yackee, that Duty Free represents a "zerotolerance" 212 approach to bribery. A holding that provides an absolute
defense to the state's solicitation and acceptance of bribes does no
such thing. Rather, it reinforces and exacerbates deep structural
imbalances that now exist in anti-bribery enforcement, whereby select
capital-exporters enforce prohibitions against those companies subject
to their jurisdiction, while corrupt officials continue to demand bribes
without penalty and companies from non-enforcing home countries
do the same. Duty Free represents a zero-tolerance approach to the
supply of bribes, but facilitates the demand side.
So too has this article sought to bring out of the "shadows" the
intuition, articulated at such length in arbitration conferences and
academic commentary, and intimated in the Duty Free award itself,
that this state of affairs simply does no good. That intuition need not
remain clandestine, for it actually stands upon far stronger legal
footing than the Duty Free award. That footing has three components.
First, just as a corporation will be held liable for the bribery of its head
officer, so too should a state be liable for the bribery of its chief officer.
There is simply no reason why it should not, and ample reason in law
and policy why it should. Second, where a state has taken the
advantage of a contract founded on reciprocal bribery, the aggrieved
business may state a claim for unjust enrichment that does not depend
upon the enforceability of the underlying contract. Third, global anticorruption policy condemns with equal force the supply and demand
of bribes, and an arbitral jurisprudence that prohibits one while
incentivizing the other does not advance that policy; indeed, it only
makes current problems in anti-bribery enforcement worse.
A better jurisprudence could make those problems better. It could
compensate for existing imbalances between supply-side and demandside enforcement, as well as discrepancies in the amounts of
enforcement resources that capital-exporting countries may or may
not dedicate to anti-bribery law. The benefits of private enforcement
could thus begin to supplement existing public enforcement, and help
to create a truly "level," equitable, and effective global anti-corruption
regime.
So too might a better jurisprudence help to insulate investor-state
dispute settlement from one of its most formidable attacks. Perhaps
the most robust criticism of ISDS today concerns its alleged
212 See Jason Yackee, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An Emerging
INT'L L. 723, 732-33 (2012).
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empowering of corporations to assert rights against host countries that
may limit those countries' ability to legislate for the public welfare.
This is variously framed in terms of encroachments on sovereignty, or
"regulatory chill." The flashpoint for this criticism has been the
arbitration claims of Philip Morris against Uruguay for requiring
prominent health warnings on tobacco packaging.2 13
But whatever the extent to which investor protections of other kinds
may cause regulatory chill, a protection against corruption would not.
An investor's claim against a host country for corruption would not
encroach upon any legitimate state prerogative; it would chill nothing,
save corruption. Indeed, this may be among the best examples of how
empowering foreign corporations to bring claims against host
governments would actually enhance the state's capacity to regulate
for the public welfare. It would tend to render governments more
transparent, responsive, and legitimate. Developing a more balanced
corruption jurisprudence may ultimately serve to protect ISDS from its
detractors and increase the chances of its inclusion in future
transnational agreements.

213 See Patricia Ranald, Expropriating Public Health Policy: Tobacco Companies' Use
of International Tribunals to Sue Governments over Public Health Regulation, 73 J. AuSTL.
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